2023
Dennis, Matthew; Ziliotti, Elena
Living Well Together Online: Digital Wellbeing from a Confucian Perspective Journal Article
In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 2, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Confucian perspective, Digital well-being
@article{nokey,
title = {Living Well Together Online: Digital Wellbeing from a Confucian Perspective},
author = {Matthew Dennis and Elena Ziliotti},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-applied-philosophy-2022-dennis-living-well-together-online-digital-wellbeing-from-a-confucian-perspective/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12627},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-01},
urldate = {2023-05-01},
journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
volume = {40},
number = {2},
abstract = {The impact of social media technologies (SMTs) on digital wellbeing has become an increasingly important puzzle for ethicists of technology. In this article, we explain why individualised theories of digital wellbeing (DWB) can only solve part of this puzzle. While an individualised conception of DWB is useful for understanding online self-regulation, we contend that we must seek greater understanding of how SMTs connect us. To build an account of this, we locate the conceptual resources for our account in Confucian ethics. In contrast to individualised conceptions of human flourishing that are found in the Western tradition, Confucian thinkers strongly emphasise that individuals cannot flourish alone, but need wider social structures (partner, family, society, nation). Not only do strands of Confucian ethics explain how individuals are defined by the roles they take up in relationships, but this perspective also makes practical suggestions for how these roles can be cultivated. We conclude our article by identifying the Confucian notions that seem to have most promise for the future design of SMTs.},
keywords = {Confucian perspective, Digital well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The impact of social media technologies (SMTs) on digital wellbeing has become an increasingly important puzzle for ethicists of technology. In this article, we explain why individualised theories of digital wellbeing (DWB) can only solve part of this puzzle. While an individualised conception of DWB is useful for understanding online self-regulation, we contend that we must seek greater understanding of how SMTs connect us. To build an account of this, we locate the conceptual resources for our account in Confucian ethics. In contrast to individualised conceptions of human flourishing that are found in the Western tradition, Confucian thinkers strongly emphasise that individuals cannot flourish alone, but need wider social structures (partner, family, society, nation). Not only do strands of Confucian ethics explain how individuals are defined by the roles they take up in relationships, but this perspective also makes practical suggestions for how these roles can be cultivated. We conclude our article by identifying the Confucian notions that seem to have most promise for the future design of SMTs.
van de Poel, Ibo
AI, Control and Unintended Consequences: The Need for Meta-Values Book Section
In: Fritzsche, Albrecht; Santa-María, Andrés (Ed.): pp. 117-129, Springer, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Experimentation, Machine ethics, Machine learning, Unintended consequences, Value sensitive design, Values
@incollection{nokey,
title = {AI, Control and Unintended Consequences: The Need for Meta-Values},
author = {Ibo van de Poel},
editor = {Albrecht Fritzsche and Andrés Santa-María},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ai-control-and-unintended/},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-25233-4_9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-29},
pages = {117-129},
publisher = {Springer},
chapter = {9},
abstract = {Due to their self-learning and evolutionary character, AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems are more prone to unintended consequences and more difficult to control than traditional sociotechnical systems. To deal with this, machine ethicists have proposed to build moral (reasoning) capacities into AI systems by designing artificial moral agents. I argue that this may well lead to more, rather than less, unintended consequences and may decrease, rather than increase, human control over such systems. Instead, I suggest, we should bring AI systems under meaningful human control by formulating a number of meta-values for their evolution. Amongst others, this requires responsible experimentation with AI systems, which may neither guarantee full control nor the prevention of all undesirable consequences, but nevertheless ensures that AI systems, and their evolution, do not get out of control.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Experimentation, Machine ethics, Machine learning, Unintended consequences, Value sensitive design, Values},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Due to their self-learning and evolutionary character, AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems are more prone to unintended consequences and more difficult to control than traditional sociotechnical systems. To deal with this, machine ethicists have proposed to build moral (reasoning) capacities into AI systems by designing artificial moral agents. I argue that this may well lead to more, rather than less, unintended consequences and may decrease, rather than increase, human control over such systems. Instead, I suggest, we should bring AI systems under meaningful human control by formulating a number of meta-values for their evolution. Amongst others, this requires responsible experimentation with AI systems, which may neither guarantee full control nor the prevention of all undesirable consequences, but nevertheless ensures that AI systems, and their evolution, do not get out of control.
Swart, Jac; van de Poel, Ibo
Corporate social responsibility and hybrid potato breeding Book Section
In: pp. 141-160, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Corporate Social Responsibility, HTPS-technology, Responsible research and innovation, sustainable development goals
@incollection{nokey,
title = {Corporate social responsibility and hybrid potato breeding},
author = {Jac Swart and Ibo van de Poel},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/swart-van-de-poel-2023-chapter-9-corporate-social-responsibility-and-hybrid-potato-breeding-balancing-economic/},
doi = {10.3920/978-90-8686-946-6_9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-17},
urldate = {2023-04-17},
pages = {141-160},
publisher = {Wageningen Academic Publishers},
chapter = {9},
abstract = {Hybrid potato breeding is an emerging technology that can have a strong impact on the potato sector by replacing seed potatoes with true seeds. The Netherlands is a world leader in certified seed potatoes and a number of Dutch companies play a pivotal role in the development of this technology. This implies a certain responsibility for the consequences and conditions of its implementation and we therefore explored how Dutch potato breeding companies see their role and responsibility especially in low- and middle-income countries in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From interviews, it appears that most potato breeding companies emphasise the promising role of hybrid potato breeding in achieving SDGs. They also stress that their core business is at the heart of corporate social responsibility as it contributes to the SDGs. We also observed that for the introduction of new varieties they often rely on trickle-down mechanisms, where local farmers are rather passive recipients, rather than being actively involved in strategic choices of innovation. It may explain why the concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which emphasises the active involvement of society and affected stakeholders, is relatively unknown in the sector. The main approach in the sector may be labelled as a ‘solution strategy’ where dominant actors rely on their expertise to solve problems. However, the attainment of SDGs should rather be considered as a wicked problem, characterised by complexity, uncertainty and multiple actor’s perspectives. A ‘negotiation strategy’, which is more inclusive and stresses the need of negotiation between different perspectives and interests, may fit better. From the perspective of RRI it is argued that insights from participatory breeding and farmer variety selection traditions and the concept of benefit sharing may be considered as promising negotiation strategies that can contribute to potato breeding practices for the attainment of SDGs.},
keywords = {Corporate Social Responsibility, HTPS-technology, Responsible research and innovation, sustainable development goals},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Hybrid potato breeding is an emerging technology that can have a strong impact on the potato sector by replacing seed potatoes with true seeds. The Netherlands is a world leader in certified seed potatoes and a number of Dutch companies play a pivotal role in the development of this technology. This implies a certain responsibility for the consequences and conditions of its implementation and we therefore explored how Dutch potato breeding companies see their role and responsibility especially in low- and middle-income countries in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From interviews, it appears that most potato breeding companies emphasise the promising role of hybrid potato breeding in achieving SDGs. They also stress that their core business is at the heart of corporate social responsibility as it contributes to the SDGs. We also observed that for the introduction of new varieties they often rely on trickle-down mechanisms, where local farmers are rather passive recipients, rather than being actively involved in strategic choices of innovation. It may explain why the concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which emphasises the active involvement of society and affected stakeholders, is relatively unknown in the sector. The main approach in the sector may be labelled as a ‘solution strategy’ where dominant actors rely on their expertise to solve problems. However, the attainment of SDGs should rather be considered as a wicked problem, characterised by complexity, uncertainty and multiple actor’s perspectives. A ‘negotiation strategy’, which is more inclusive and stresses the need of negotiation between different perspectives and interests, may fit better. From the perspective of RRI it is argued that insights from participatory breeding and farmer variety selection traditions and the concept of benefit sharing may be considered as promising negotiation strategies that can contribute to potato breeding practices for the attainment of SDGs.
Archer, Alfred; Dennis, Matthew
Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes Journal Article
In: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Aesthetic normativity, Moral demandingness, Moral exemplars, Obligation, Supererogation
@article{nokey,
title = {Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes},
author = {Alfred Archer and Matthew Dennis},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/exemplars-and-expertise-what-we-cannot-learn-from-saints-and-heroes/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2196681},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-08},
journal = { Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy},
abstract = {According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not.},
keywords = {Aesthetic normativity, Moral demandingness, Moral exemplars, Obligation, Supererogation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not.
Hopster, Jeroen
Disruptieve technologie Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 4-5, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Disruptive technology
@article{nokey,
title = {Disruptieve technologie},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {4-5},
keywords = {Disruptive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
van Balen, Bouke; van Grunsven, Janna; Vansteensel, Mariska; IJsselsteijn, Wijnand
Brain Computer Interfaces Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 16-23, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Brain computer interfaces
@article{nokey,
title = {Brain Computer Interfaces},
author = {Bouke van Balen and Janna van Grunsven and Mariska Vansteensel and Wijnand IJsselsteijn},
url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {16-23},
keywords = {Brain computer interfaces},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Royakkers, Lambèr
Augmented Reality Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 24-33, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Augmented Reality},
author = {Lambèr Royakkers},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/augmented-reality/
},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {24-33},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Jacobs, Naomi
Disruptie: De Kunstmatige Baarmoeder en het idee van (goed) moederschap Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 7-15, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: artificial wombs
@article{nokey,
title = {Disruptie: De Kunstmatige Baarmoeder en het idee van (goed) moederschap},
author = {Naomi Jacobs},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/de-kunstmatige-baarmoeder/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
number = {1},
pages = {7-15},
keywords = {artificial wombs},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Bombaerts, Gunter; Anderson, Joel; Dennis, Matthew; Gerola, Alessio; Frank, Lily; Hannes, Tom; Hopster, Jeroen; Marin, Lavinia; Spahn, Andreas
Attention as Practice Journal Article
In: glob. Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2023, ISSN: 2948-1538.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology
@article{Bombaerts2023b,
title = {Attention as Practice},
author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Joel Anderson and Matthew Dennis and Alessio Gerola and Lily Frank and Tom Hannes and Jeroen Hopster and Lavinia Marin and Andreas Spahn},
doi = {10.1007/s10516-023-09680-4},
issn = {2948-1538},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-00},
urldate = {2023-04-00},
journal = {glob. Philosophy},
volume = {33},
number = {2},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.},
keywords = {Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.
Wieners, Claudia; Hofbauer, Benjamin; Vries, Iris De; Honegger, Matthias; Visioni, Daniele; Russchenberg, Hermann; Felgenhauer, Tyler
Solar radiation modification is risky, but so is rejecting it: a call for balanced research Journal Article
In: Oxford Open Climate Change, vol. 3, iss. 1, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate change, Climate mitigation
@article{nokey,
title = {Solar radiation modification is risky, but so is rejecting it: a call for balanced research },
author = {Claudia Wieners and Benjamin Hofbauer and Iris De Vries and Matthias Honegger and Daniele Visioni and Hermann Russchenberg and Tyler Felgenhauer},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/solar-radiation/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfclm/kgad002},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-20},
urldate = {2023-03-20},
journal = {Oxford Open Climate Change},
volume = {3},
issue = {1},
keywords = {Climate change, Climate mitigation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Asin-Garcia, Enrique; Robaey, Zoë; Kampers, Linde; dos Santos, Vitor Martins
Exploring the Impact of Tensions in Stakeholder Norms on Designing for Value Change: The Case of Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology Journal Article
In: Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 29, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biosafety, Genetic safeguards, Industrial biotechnology, Multistakeholder approach, Safe-by-design framework, Value sensitive design
@article{nokey,
title = {Exploring the Impact of Tensions in Stakeholder Norms on Designing for Value Change: The Case of Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology},
author = {Enrique Asin-Garcia and Zoë Robaey and Linde Kampers and Vitor Martins dos Santos },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s11948-023-00432-6/},
doi = {10.1007/s11948-023-00432-6},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-07},
urldate = {2023-03-07},
journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics},
volume = {29},
abstract = {Synthetic biologists design and engineer organisms for a better and more sustainable future. While the manifold prospects are encouraging, concerns about the uncertain risks of genome editing affect public opinion as well as local regulations. As a consequence, biosafety and associated concepts, such as the Safe-by-design framework and genetic safeguard technologies, have gained notoriety and occupy a central position in the conversation about genetically modified organisms. Yet, as regulatory interest and academic research in genetic safeguard technologies advance, the implementation in industrial biotechnology, a sector that is already employing engineered microorganisms, lags behind. The main goal of this work is to explore the utilization of genetic safeguard technologies for designing biosafety in industrial biotechnology. Based on our results, we posit that biosafety is a case of a changing value, by means of further specification of how to realize biosafety. Our investigation is inspired by the Value Sensitive Design framework, to investigate scientific and technological choices in their appropriate social context. Our findings discuss stakeholder norms for biosafety, reasonings about genetic safeguards, and how these impact the practice of designing for biosafety. We show that tensions between stakeholders occur at the level of norms, and that prior stakeholder alignment is crucial for value specification to happen in practice. Finally, we elaborate in different reasonings about genetic safeguards for biosafety and conclude that, in absence of a common multi-stakeholder effort, the differences in informal biosafety norms and the disparity in biosafety thinking could end up leading to design requirements for compliance instead of for safety.},
keywords = {Biosafety, Genetic safeguards, Industrial biotechnology, Multistakeholder approach, Safe-by-design framework, Value sensitive design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Synthetic biologists design and engineer organisms for a better and more sustainable future. While the manifold prospects are encouraging, concerns about the uncertain risks of genome editing affect public opinion as well as local regulations. As a consequence, biosafety and associated concepts, such as the Safe-by-design framework and genetic safeguard technologies, have gained notoriety and occupy a central position in the conversation about genetically modified organisms. Yet, as regulatory interest and academic research in genetic safeguard technologies advance, the implementation in industrial biotechnology, a sector that is already employing engineered microorganisms, lags behind. The main goal of this work is to explore the utilization of genetic safeguard technologies for designing biosafety in industrial biotechnology. Based on our results, we posit that biosafety is a case of a changing value, by means of further specification of how to realize biosafety. Our investigation is inspired by the Value Sensitive Design framework, to investigate scientific and technological choices in their appropriate social context. Our findings discuss stakeholder norms for biosafety, reasonings about genetic safeguards, and how these impact the practice of designing for biosafety. We show that tensions between stakeholders occur at the level of norms, and that prior stakeholder alignment is crucial for value specification to happen in practice. Finally, we elaborate in different reasonings about genetic safeguards for biosafety and conclude that, in absence of a common multi-stakeholder effort, the differences in informal biosafety norms and the disparity in biosafety thinking could end up leading to design requirements for compliance instead of for safety.
Sparrow, Robert; Henschke, Adam
Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future Of Manned-Unmanned Teaming Journal Article
In: The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, vol. 53, iss. 1, no. 14, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autonomous weapon systems, Centaur warfighting, Ethics, Future force, Manned-unmanned teaming
@article{nokey,
title = {Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future Of Manned-Unmanned Teaming},
author = {Robert Sparrow and Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/minotaurs-not-centaurs_-the-future-of-manned-unmanned-teaming/},
doi = {10.55540/0031-1723.3207},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-03},
urldate = {2023-03-03},
journal = {The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters},
volume = {53},
number = {14},
issue = {1},
abstract = {Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting.},
keywords = {Autonomous weapon systems, Centaur warfighting, Ethics, Future force, Manned-unmanned teaming},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting.
Kamphorst, Bart; Verweij, Marcel; van Zeben, Josephine
On the voluntariness of public health apps: a European case study on digital contact tracing Journal Article
In: Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 15, pp. 107-123, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Digital contract tracing, Liberty, Smart phone apps, Stigmatisation, Voluntariness
@article{nokey,
title = {On the voluntariness of public health apps: a European case study on digital contact tracing},
author = {Bart Kamphorst and Marcel Verweij and Josephine van Zeben},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/on-the-voluntariness-of-public-health-apps-a-european-case-study-on-digital-contact-tracing/},
doi = {10.1080/17579961.2023.2184137},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-03},
urldate = {2023-03-03},
journal = {Law, Innovation and Technology},
volume = {15},
pages = {107-123},
abstract = {As evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing reliance on smartphone apps such as digital contact tracing apps and vaccination passports to respond to and mitigate public health threats. In light of the European Commission's guidance, Member States typically offer such apps on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. In this paper, we question the extent to which the individual choice to use these apps – and similar future technologies – is indeed a voluntary one. By explicating ethical and legal considerations governing the choice situations surrounding the use of smartphone apps, specifically those related to the negative consequences that declining the use of these apps may have (e.g. loss of opportunities, social exclusion, stigma), we argue that the projected downsides of refusal may in effect limit the liberty to decline for certain subpopulations. To mitigate these concerns, we recommend three categories of approaches that may be employed by governments to safeguard voluntariness.},
keywords = {Digital contract tracing, Liberty, Smart phone apps, Stigmatisation, Voluntariness},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
As evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing reliance on smartphone apps such as digital contact tracing apps and vaccination passports to respond to and mitigate public health threats. In light of the European Commission's guidance, Member States typically offer such apps on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. In this paper, we question the extent to which the individual choice to use these apps – and similar future technologies – is indeed a voluntary one. By explicating ethical and legal considerations governing the choice situations surrounding the use of smartphone apps, specifically those related to the negative consequences that declining the use of these apps may have (e.g. loss of opportunities, social exclusion, stigma), we argue that the projected downsides of refusal may in effect limit the liberty to decline for certain subpopulations. To mitigate these concerns, we recommend three categories of approaches that may be employed by governments to safeguard voluntariness.
Zwier, Jochem; de Boer, Bas
Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene Journal Article
In: Environmental Humanities, vol. 15, iss. 1, pp. 64-68, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity
@article{nokey,
title = {Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene},
author = {Jochem Zwier and Bas de Boer},
doi = {10.1215/22011919-10216162},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Environmental Humanities},
volume = {15},
issue = {1},
pages = {64-68},
keywords = {Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Königs, Peter
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology Journal Article
In: Utilitas, vol. 35, iss. 1, pp. 70-87, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology
@article{nokey,
title = {Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology},
author = { Peter Königs},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000395},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Utilitas},
volume = {35},
issue = {1},
pages = {70-87},
abstract = {Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.},
keywords = {ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.
Lundgren, Björn
Two notes on Axiological Futurism Journal Article
In: Futures, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Axiological Futurism, Axiology, Disagreement, Value theory
@article{nokey,
title = {Two notes on Axiological Futurism},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/two-notes-on-axiological-futurism/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-14},
journal = {Futures},
abstract = {Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this
commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought
to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.},
keywords = {Axiological Futurism, Axiology, Disagreement, Value theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this
commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought
to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.
commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought
to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.
Michel, Christian; Löhr, Guido
Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply Journal Article
In: Cognitieve Science, vol. 47, iss. 2, no. e13249, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account
@article{nokey,
title = {Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply},
author = {Christian Michel and Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1111/cogs.13249},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-05},
urldate = {2023-02-05},
journal = {Cognitieve Science},
volume = {47},
number = {e13249},
issue = {2},
abstract = {In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.},
keywords = {Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.
Lundgren, Björn
An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten Journal Article
In: Telecommunications Policy, vol. 47, iss. 1, no. 102446, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency
@article{nokey,
title = {An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
doi = {10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Telecommunications Policy},
volume = {47},
number = {102446},
issue = {1},
keywords = {Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
(Ed.)
Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach Collection
Springer, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Responsible research and innovation, RRI
@collection{Blok2023,
title = {Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach},
author = {Vincent Blok },
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-14710-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Responsible research and innovation, RRI},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {collection}
}
Löhr, Guido
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 72, no. 102160, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {72},
number = {102160},
abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.
Fraaije, Aafke
2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Citizen engagement, Responsible Innovation, Smart City
@phdthesis{nokey,
title = {Can (sm)art save the city?: Lessons from action research on art-based citizen engagement towards responsible innovation in ‘smart city’Amsterdam},
author = {Aafke Fraaije},
doi = {10.5463/thesis.71},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
keywords = {Citizen engagement, Responsible Innovation, Smart City},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {phdthesis}
}
Remmers, Gaston; Hermann, Julia; Siebrand, Egbert; van Leersum, Catharina M.
Mind the Relationship: A Multi-Layered Ethical Framework for Citizen Science in Health Journal Article
In: Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics , vol. XXV, iss. 2, pp. 171-196, 2023.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Capabilities approach, care ethics, citizen science, health, Justice, participation
@article{nokey,
title = {Mind the Relationship: A Multi-Layered Ethical Framework for Citizen Science in Health},
author = {Gaston Remmers and Julia Hermann and Egbert Siebrand and Catharina M. van Leersum},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
journal = {Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics },
volume = {XXV},
issue = {2},
pages = {171-196},
abstract = {There is a heated debate about what citizen science is and is not. We argue that instead of aiming
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
},
keywords = {Capabilities approach, care ethics, citizen science, health, Justice, participation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There is a heated debate about what citizen science is and is not. We argue that instead of aiming
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
van der Puil, Roxanne; Spahn, Andreas; Royakkers, Lambèr
Which Democratic Way to Go?: Using Democracy Theories in Social Media Design Journal Article
In: International Journal of Technoethics, vol. 14, iss. 1, pp. 20, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autonomy, Democracy, Equality
@article{nokey,
title = {Which Democratic Way to Go?: Using Democracy Theories in Social Media Design},
author = {Roxanne van der Puil and Andreas Spahn and Lambèr Royakkers},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/which-democratic-way-to-go__-using-democracy-theories-in-social-media-design/},
doi = {10.4018/IJT.331800},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
journal = {International Journal of Technoethics},
volume = {14},
issue = {1},
pages = {20},
abstract = {There are concerns amongst researchers and the general public that social media platforms threaten democratic values. Social media corporations and their engineers have responded to these concerns with various design solutions. Though the objective of designing social media democratically sounds straightforward, the concrete reality is not. The authors discuss what a democratic design for social media platforms could look like by exploring two classical conceptions of democracy, one in the liberal tradition and the other in the deliberative tradition. In particular, they discuss three concerns: 1) mis- and disinformation; 2) hate speech; and 3) the relations between filter bubbles, echo chambers, and public debate. By describing the underlying ideals of the two traditions and translating these into design guidelines, the authors make explicit how varied and contrary the implications of different conceptions of democracy can be for addressing public concerns and designing for democratic social media. With these things in mind, this article responds to a call, which is to raise awareness among social media corporations, engineers, and policymakers about varying democratic ideals and the implications that these may have for social media.},
keywords = {Autonomy, Democracy, Equality},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There are concerns amongst researchers and the general public that social media platforms threaten democratic values. Social media corporations and their engineers have responded to these concerns with various design solutions. Though the objective of designing social media democratically sounds straightforward, the concrete reality is not. The authors discuss what a democratic design for social media platforms could look like by exploring two classical conceptions of democracy, one in the liberal tradition and the other in the deliberative tradition. In particular, they discuss three concerns: 1) mis- and disinformation; 2) hate speech; and 3) the relations between filter bubbles, echo chambers, and public debate. By describing the underlying ideals of the two traditions and translating these into design guidelines, the authors make explicit how varied and contrary the implications of different conceptions of democracy can be for addressing public concerns and designing for democratic social media. With these things in mind, this article responds to a call, which is to raise awareness among social media corporations, engineers, and policymakers about varying democratic ideals and the implications that these may have for social media.
Wareham, Christopher; Garcia-Barranquero, Pablo
A Vaccine for the Pandemic of Aging? Conceptual and Ethical Issues Book Chapter
In: Rizvi, Syed Ibrahim (Ed.): Springer, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ageing, Anti-ageing, Covid, Ethic, Life extension, Vaccine
@inbook{nokey,
title = {A Vaccine for the Pandemic of Aging? Conceptual and Ethical Issues},
author = {Christopher Wareham and Pablo Garcia-Barranquero },
editor = {Syed Ibrahim Rizvi},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/a-vaccine-for-the-pandemic-of-aging/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7443-4_15},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
publisher = {Springer},
abstract = {In this chapter, we develop and extend the above analogy by means of a thought experiment in which a vaccine for the pandemic of aging is developed. We ask first, whether the concept of a vaccine for the pandemic of aging is conceptually coherent, and second whether such a vaccine (or similar aging preventive) is ethically desirable. This chapter makes the case that, while there are some clear disanalogies between aging and typical pandemics like the COVID-19 pandemic, there are some striking similarities that advocate for similar degrees of urgency. Moreover, the comparison throws important light on some of the flawed objections to healthy life-extending technologies.},
keywords = {Ageing, Anti-ageing, Covid, Ethic, Life extension, Vaccine},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
In this chapter, we develop and extend the above analogy by means of a thought experiment in which a vaccine for the pandemic of aging is developed. We ask first, whether the concept of a vaccine for the pandemic of aging is conceptually coherent, and second whether such a vaccine (or similar aging preventive) is ethically desirable. This chapter makes the case that, while there are some clear disanalogies between aging and typical pandemics like the COVID-19 pandemic, there are some striking similarities that advocate for similar degrees of urgency. Moreover, the comparison throws important light on some of the flawed objections to healthy life-extending technologies.
Brew-Sam, Nicola; Parkinson, Anne; Chhabra, Madhur; Henschke, Adam; Brown, Ellen; Pedley, Lachlan; Pedley, Elizabeth; Hannan, Kristal; Brown, Karen; Wright, Kristine; Phillips, Christine; Tricoli, Antonio; Nolan, Christopher; Suominen, Hanna; Desborough, Jane
In: JMIR Diabetes, vol. 8, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Data- and theory-driven analysis, Improved device design, Type 1 diabetes mellitus, UTAUT, value-sensitive design, Young people
@article{nokey,
title = {Toward Diabetes Device Development That Is Mindful to the Needs of Young People Living With Type 1 Diabetes: A Data- and Theory-Driven Qualitative Study},
author = {Nicola Brew-Sam and Anne Parkinson and Madhur Chhabra and Adam Henschke and Ellen Brown and Lachlan Pedley and Elizabeth Pedley and Kristal Hannan and Karen Brown and Kristine Wright and Christine Phillips and Antonio Tricoli and Christopher Nolan and Hanna Suominen and Jane Desborough},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/pdf/},
doi = {doi:10.2196/43377},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-25},
urldate = {2023-01-25},
journal = {JMIR Diabetes},
volume = {8},
abstract = {Abstract
Background:
An important strategy to understand young people’s needs regarding technologies for type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) management is to examine their day-to-day experiences with these technologies.
Objective:
This study aimed to examine young people’s and their caregivers’ experiences with diabetes technologies in an exploratory way and relate the findings to the existing technology acceptance and technology design theories. On the basis of this procedure, we aimed to develop device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Methods:
Overall, 16 in-person and web-based face-to-face interviews were conducted with 7 female and 9 male young people with T1DM (aged between 12 and 17 years) and their parents between December 2019 and July 2020. The participants were recruited through a pediatric diabetes clinic based at Canberra Hospital. Data-driven thematic analysis was performed before theory-driven analysis to incorporate empirical data results into the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and value-sensitive design (VSD). We used the COREQ (Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research) checklist for reporting our research procedure and findings. In this paper, we summarize the key device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Results:
Summarized interview themes from the data-driven analysis included aspects of self-management, device use, technological characteristics, and feelings associated with device types. In the subsequent theory-driven analysis, the interview themes aligned with all UTAUT and VSD factors except for one (privacy). Privacy concerns or related aspects were not reported throughout the interviews, and none of the participants made any mention of data privacy. Discussions around ideal device characteristics focused on reliability, flexibility, and automated closed loop systems that enable young people with T1DM to lead an independent life and alleviate parental anxiety. However, in line with a previous systematic review by Brew-Sam et al, the analysis showed that reality deviated from these expectations, with inaccuracy problems reported in continuous glucose monitoring devices and technical failures occurring in both continuous glucose monitoring devices and insulin pumps.
Conclusions:
Our research highlights the benefits of the transdisciplinary use of exploratory and theory-informed methods for designing improved technologies. Technologies for diabetes self-management require continual advancement to meet the needs and expectations of young people with T1DM and their caregivers. The UTAUT and VSD approaches were found useful as a combined foundation for structuring the findings of our study.},
keywords = {Data- and theory-driven analysis, Improved device design, Type 1 diabetes mellitus, UTAUT, value-sensitive design, Young people},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Abstract
Background:
An important strategy to understand young people’s needs regarding technologies for type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) management is to examine their day-to-day experiences with these technologies.
Objective:
This study aimed to examine young people’s and their caregivers’ experiences with diabetes technologies in an exploratory way and relate the findings to the existing technology acceptance and technology design theories. On the basis of this procedure, we aimed to develop device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Methods:
Overall, 16 in-person and web-based face-to-face interviews were conducted with 7 female and 9 male young people with T1DM (aged between 12 and 17 years) and their parents between December 2019 and July 2020. The participants were recruited through a pediatric diabetes clinic based at Canberra Hospital. Data-driven thematic analysis was performed before theory-driven analysis to incorporate empirical data results into the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and value-sensitive design (VSD). We used the COREQ (Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research) checklist for reporting our research procedure and findings. In this paper, we summarize the key device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Results:
Summarized interview themes from the data-driven analysis included aspects of self-management, device use, technological characteristics, and feelings associated with device types. In the subsequent theory-driven analysis, the interview themes aligned with all UTAUT and VSD factors except for one (privacy). Privacy concerns or related aspects were not reported throughout the interviews, and none of the participants made any mention of data privacy. Discussions around ideal device characteristics focused on reliability, flexibility, and automated closed loop systems that enable young people with T1DM to lead an independent life and alleviate parental anxiety. However, in line with a previous systematic review by Brew-Sam et al, the analysis showed that reality deviated from these expectations, with inaccuracy problems reported in continuous glucose monitoring devices and technical failures occurring in both continuous glucose monitoring devices and insulin pumps.
Conclusions:
Our research highlights the benefits of the transdisciplinary use of exploratory and theory-informed methods for designing improved technologies. Technologies for diabetes self-management require continual advancement to meet the needs and expectations of young people with T1DM and their caregivers. The UTAUT and VSD approaches were found useful as a combined foundation for structuring the findings of our study.
Background:
An important strategy to understand young people’s needs regarding technologies for type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) management is to examine their day-to-day experiences with these technologies.
Objective:
This study aimed to examine young people’s and their caregivers’ experiences with diabetes technologies in an exploratory way and relate the findings to the existing technology acceptance and technology design theories. On the basis of this procedure, we aimed to develop device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Methods:
Overall, 16 in-person and web-based face-to-face interviews were conducted with 7 female and 9 male young people with T1DM (aged between 12 and 17 years) and their parents between December 2019 and July 2020. The participants were recruited through a pediatric diabetes clinic based at Canberra Hospital. Data-driven thematic analysis was performed before theory-driven analysis to incorporate empirical data results into the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and value-sensitive design (VSD). We used the COREQ (Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research) checklist for reporting our research procedure and findings. In this paper, we summarize the key device characteristics that meet young people’s needs.
Results:
Summarized interview themes from the data-driven analysis included aspects of self-management, device use, technological characteristics, and feelings associated with device types. In the subsequent theory-driven analysis, the interview themes aligned with all UTAUT and VSD factors except for one (privacy). Privacy concerns or related aspects were not reported throughout the interviews, and none of the participants made any mention of data privacy. Discussions around ideal device characteristics focused on reliability, flexibility, and automated closed loop systems that enable young people with T1DM to lead an independent life and alleviate parental anxiety. However, in line with a previous systematic review by Brew-Sam et al, the analysis showed that reality deviated from these expectations, with inaccuracy problems reported in continuous glucose monitoring devices and technical failures occurring in both continuous glucose monitoring devices and insulin pumps.
Conclusions:
Our research highlights the benefits of the transdisciplinary use of exploratory and theory-informed methods for designing improved technologies. Technologies for diabetes self-management require continual advancement to meet the needs and expectations of young people with T1DM and their caregivers. The UTAUT and VSD approaches were found useful as a combined foundation for structuring the findings of our study.
Lundgren, Björn
In defense of ethical guidelines Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI Ethics, Ethical principles, Ethics guidelines
@article{nokey,
title = {In defense of ethical guidelines},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-17},
urldate = {2023-01-17},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
keywords = {AI Ethics, Ethical principles, Ethics guidelines},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Nyholm, Sven
This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction Book
Wiley Blackwell, 2023, ISBN: 978-1-119-75557-9.
BibTeX | Tags: Ethics of Technology
@book{nokey,
title = {This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
isbn = {978-1-119-75557-9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-05},
urldate = {2023-01-05},
publisher = {Wiley Blackwell},
keywords = {Ethics of Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Klein, Colin; Cheong, Marc; Ferreira, Marinus; Sullivan, Emily; Alfano, Mark
International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications, Springer, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Profiling Toolkit, Wisdom of the Crowds
@conference{nokey,
title = {The wisdom_of_crowds: An Efficient, Philosophically-Validated, Social Epistemological Network Profiling Toolkit},
author = {Colin Klein and Marc Cheong and Marinus Ferreira and Emily Sullivan and Mark Alfano},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-21127-0_6},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-04},
urldate = {2023-01-04},
booktitle = {International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications},
journal = {International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Profiling Toolkit, Wisdom of the Crowds},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}
Cristina, Voinea; Marin, Lavinia; Vică, Constantin
The moral source of collective irrationality during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns Journal Article
In: Philosophical Psychology, vol. 36, iss. 5, pp. 1-20, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Collective irrationality, COVID-19, Moral reasons, Social media, Vaccine hesitancy
@article{nokey,
title = {The moral source of collective irrationality during COVID-19 vaccination campaigns},
author = {Voinea Cristina and Lavinia Marin and Constantin Vică},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-moral-source-of-collective-irrationality-during-covid-19-vaccination-campaigns/},
doi = {10.1080/09515089.2022.2164264},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-03},
urldate = {2023-01-03},
journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
volume = {36},
issue = {5},
pages = {1-20},
abstract = {Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain the collective irrationality of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, such as partisanship and ideology, exposure to misinformation and conspiracy theories or the effectiveness of public messaging. This paper presents a complementary explanation to epistemic accounts of collective irrationality, focusing on the moral reasons underlying people’s decisions regarding vaccination. We argue that the moralization of COVID-19 risk mitigation measures contributed to the polarization of groups along moral values, which ultimately led to the emergence of collective irrational behaviors. Collective irrationality arises from groups explicitly or implicitly endorsing values that ultimately harm both themselves and those around. The role of social media platforms in amplifying this polarization and contributing to the emergence of collective irrationality is also examined. Finally, potential strategies for addressing the moral sources of collective irrationality are discussed.},
keywords = {Collective irrationality, COVID-19, Moral reasons, Social media, Vaccine hesitancy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain the collective irrationality of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, such as partisanship and ideology, exposure to misinformation and conspiracy theories or the effectiveness of public messaging. This paper presents a complementary explanation to epistemic accounts of collective irrationality, focusing on the moral reasons underlying people’s decisions regarding vaccination. We argue that the moralization of COVID-19 risk mitigation measures contributed to the polarization of groups along moral values, which ultimately led to the emergence of collective irrational behaviors. Collective irrationality arises from groups explicitly or implicitly endorsing values that ultimately harm both themselves and those around. The role of social media platforms in amplifying this polarization and contributing to the emergence of collective irrationality is also examined. Finally, potential strategies for addressing the moral sources of collective irrationality are discussed.
Nyholm, Sven
Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid Robots, and Old and New Control Problems Book Chapter
In: Hakli, R.; Mäkelä, P.; Seibt, J. (Ed.): pp. 3-12, IOS Press, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Humanoid robots, The control problem
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid Robots, and Old and New Control Problems},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
editor = {R. Hakli and P. Mäkelä and J. Seibt},
doi = {10.3233/FAIA220594},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-01},
urldate = {2023-01-01},
pages = {3-12},
publisher = {IOS Press},
abstract = {In this paper, I discuss what I call a new control problem related to AI in the form of humanoid robots, and I compare it to what I call the old control problem related to AI more generally. The old control problem – discussed by authors such as Alan Turing, Norbert Wiener, and Roman Yampolskiy – concerns a worry that we might lose control over advanced AI technologies, which is seen as something that would be instrumentally bad. The new control problem is that there might be certain types of AI technologies – in particular, AI technologies in the form of lifelike humanoid robots – where there might be something problematic, at least from a symbolic point of view, about wanting to completely control these robots. The reason for this is that such robots might be seen as symbolizing human persons and because wanting to control such robots might therefore be seen as symbolizing something non-instrumentally bad: persons controlling other persons. A more general statement of the new control problem is to say that it is the problem of describing under what circumstances having complete control over AI technologies is unambiguously good from an ethical point of view. This paper sketches an answer to this by also discussing AI technologies that do not take the form of humanoid robots and that are such that control over them can be conceptualized as a form of extended self-control.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Humanoid robots, The control problem},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
In this paper, I discuss what I call a new control problem related to AI in the form of humanoid robots, and I compare it to what I call the old control problem related to AI more generally. The old control problem – discussed by authors such as Alan Turing, Norbert Wiener, and Roman Yampolskiy – concerns a worry that we might lose control over advanced AI technologies, which is seen as something that would be instrumentally bad. The new control problem is that there might be certain types of AI technologies – in particular, AI technologies in the form of lifelike humanoid robots – where there might be something problematic, at least from a symbolic point of view, about wanting to completely control these robots. The reason for this is that such robots might be seen as symbolizing human persons and because wanting to control such robots might therefore be seen as symbolizing something non-instrumentally bad: persons controlling other persons. A more general statement of the new control problem is to say that it is the problem of describing under what circumstances having complete control over AI technologies is unambiguously good from an ethical point of view. This paper sketches an answer to this by also discussing AI technologies that do not take the form of humanoid robots and that are such that control over them can be conceptualized as a form of extended self-control.
Friedman, Cindy
Granting Negative Rights to Humanoid Robots Journal Article
In: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 366, pp. 145-154, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Humanoid robots, Negative rights
@article{nokey,
title = {Granting Negative Rights to Humanoid Robots},
author = {Cindy Friedman},
url = {https://ebooks.iospress.nl/doi/10.3233/FAIA220613},
doi = {10.3233/FAIA220613},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-01},
journal = {Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications},
volume = {366},
pages = {145-154},
abstract = {The paper argues that we should grant negative rights to humanoid robots. These are rights that relate to non-interference e.g., freedom from violence, or freedom from discrimination. Doing so will prevent moral degradation to our human society. The consideration of robot moral status has seen a progression towards the consideration of robot rights. This is a controversial debate, with many scholars seeing the consideration of robot rights in black and white. It is, however, valuable to take a nuanced approach. This paper highlights the value of taking a nuanced approach by arguing that we should consider negative rights for humanoid robots. Where a lot of discussion about robot rights centres around the possibility of robot consciousness which would warrant robots being protected by rights for their own moral sakes, the paper takes a human-centred approach. It argues that we should, at least, grant negative rights to humanoid robots for the sake of human beings and not necessarily only for the sake of robots. This is because, given the human-likeness of humanoid robots, we relate to them in a human-like way. Should we, in the context of these relations, treat these robots immorally, there is concern that we may damage our own moral fibre or, more collectively, society’s moral fibre. Thus, inhibiting the immoral treatment of robots, protects the moral fibre of society, thereby preventing moral degradation in our human society.},
keywords = {Humanoid robots, Negative rights},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The paper argues that we should grant negative rights to humanoid robots. These are rights that relate to non-interference e.g., freedom from violence, or freedom from discrimination. Doing so will prevent moral degradation to our human society. The consideration of robot moral status has seen a progression towards the consideration of robot rights. This is a controversial debate, with many scholars seeing the consideration of robot rights in black and white. It is, however, valuable to take a nuanced approach. This paper highlights the value of taking a nuanced approach by arguing that we should consider negative rights for humanoid robots. Where a lot of discussion about robot rights centres around the possibility of robot consciousness which would warrant robots being protected by rights for their own moral sakes, the paper takes a human-centred approach. It argues that we should, at least, grant negative rights to humanoid robots for the sake of human beings and not necessarily only for the sake of robots. This is because, given the human-likeness of humanoid robots, we relate to them in a human-like way. Should we, in the context of these relations, treat these robots immorally, there is concern that we may damage our own moral fibre or, more collectively, society’s moral fibre. Thus, inhibiting the immoral treatment of robots, protects the moral fibre of society, thereby preventing moral degradation in our human society.
2022
Ziliotti, Elena
An Epistemic Case for Confucian Democracy Journal Article
In: Critical International Review of Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 1-23, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Confucian political meritocracy, Confucianism, Democratic participation, Epistemic democracy, Political participation, Well-being
@article{nokey,
title = {An Epistemic Case for Confucian Democracy},
author = {Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {10.1080/13698230.2020.1838736},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-31},
urldate = {2022-12-31},
journal = {Critical International Review of Social and Political Philosophy},
pages = {1-23},
keywords = {Confucian political meritocracy, Confucianism, Democratic participation, Epistemic democracy, Political participation, Well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Anderson, Joel
Scaffolding and Autonomy Book Chapter
In: Colburn, Ben (Ed.): Routledge, 1, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autonomy, Disability studies, Extended agency, Relational ethics
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Scaffolding and Autonomy},
author = {Joel Anderson},
editor = {Ben Colburn},
doi = {10.4324/9780429290411},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
series = {The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy},
keywords = {Autonomy, Disability studies, Extended agency, Relational ethics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Hermann, Julia
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 19-34, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty},
author = {Julia Hermann},
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {19-34},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
O'Hara, Neil; Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; Pleasants, Nigel
Introduction on Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 1-18, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Introduction on Moral Certainty},
author = {Neil O'Hara and Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Nigel Pleasants },
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {1-18},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
Bauer, Katharina; Hermann, Julia
Technomoral Resilience as a Goal of Moral Education Journal Article
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Care Robots, Disruption, Moral education, Moral imagination, Moral resilience, Technomoral Change
@article{nokey,
title = {Technomoral Resilience as a Goal of Moral Education},
author = {Katharina Bauer and Julia Hermann},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10353-1 },
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-24},
urldate = {2022-12-24},
journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
abstract = {In today’s highly dynamic societies, moral norms and values are subject to change. Moral change is partly driven by technological developments. For instance, the introduction of robots in elderly care practices requires caregivers to share moral responsibility with a robot (see van Wynsberghe 2013). Since we do not know what elements of morality will change and how they will change (see van der Burg 2003), moral education should aim at fostering what has been called “moral resilience” (Swierstra 2013). We seek to fill two gaps in the existing literature: (i) research on moral education has not paid enough attention to the development of moral resilience; (ii) the very limited literature on moral resilience does not conceptualise moral resilience in relation to new technological developments. We argue that philosophical accounts of moral education need to do justice to the importance of moral resilience, and that a specific form of moral resilience should be conceptualised as “technomoral resilience” to underline the added value of cultivating moral resilience in relation to technomoral change. We illustrate the role of technomoral resilience in practice by looking at the context of elderly care. To make the first step towards an account of how technomoral resilience can be fostered in moral education, we propose that moral education shall focus on a triangle of capacities: (1) moral imagination, (2) a capacity for critical reflection, and (3) a capacity for maintaining one’s moral agency in the face of disturbances.},
keywords = {Care Robots, Disruption, Moral education, Moral imagination, Moral resilience, Technomoral Change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In today’s highly dynamic societies, moral norms and values are subject to change. Moral change is partly driven by technological developments. For instance, the introduction of robots in elderly care practices requires caregivers to share moral responsibility with a robot (see van Wynsberghe 2013). Since we do not know what elements of morality will change and how they will change (see van der Burg 2003), moral education should aim at fostering what has been called “moral resilience” (Swierstra 2013). We seek to fill two gaps in the existing literature: (i) research on moral education has not paid enough attention to the development of moral resilience; (ii) the very limited literature on moral resilience does not conceptualise moral resilience in relation to new technological developments. We argue that philosophical accounts of moral education need to do justice to the importance of moral resilience, and that a specific form of moral resilience should be conceptualised as “technomoral resilience” to underline the added value of cultivating moral resilience in relation to technomoral change. We illustrate the role of technomoral resilience in practice by looking at the context of elderly care. To make the first step towards an account of how technomoral resilience can be fostered in moral education, we propose that moral education shall focus on a triangle of capacities: (1) moral imagination, (2) a capacity for critical reflection, and (3) a capacity for maintaining one’s moral agency in the face of disturbances.
Archer, Alfred; Alfano, Mark; Dennis, Matthew
On the Uses and Abuses of Celebrity Epistemic Power Journal Article
In: 2022.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Celebrity, Epistemic justice, Epistemic power, Trust
@article{nokey,
title = {On the Uses and Abuses of Celebrity Epistemic Power},
author = {Alfred Archer and Mark Alfano and Matthew Dennis},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/on-the-uses-and-abuses-of-celebrity-epistemic-power/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2153351},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-22},
urldate = {2022-12-22},
abstract = {The testimonies of celebrities affect the lives of their many followers who pay attention to what they say. This gives celebrities a high degree of epistemic power, which has come under scrutiny during the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper investigates the duties that arise from this power. We argue that celebrities have a negative duty of testimonial justice not to undermine trust in authoritative sources by spreading misinformation or directing attention to untrustworthy sources. Moreover, celebrities have a general imperfect duty to try to correct for an unjust distribution of attention by redirecting it to those who deserve it. During a pandemic this may become a perfect one, due to the harm that could be prevented if people follow the advice of experts. Relatedly, we argue that celebrities have an imperfect duty to promote behavior that will reduce the spread of a pandemic. We outline three ways they might do so: they might take on the position of a role model, they may act as a salience magnet or they can direct people’s attention towards others who have taken on these roles.},
keywords = {Celebrity, Epistemic justice, Epistemic power, Trust},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The testimonies of celebrities affect the lives of their many followers who pay attention to what they say. This gives celebrities a high degree of epistemic power, which has come under scrutiny during the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper investigates the duties that arise from this power. We argue that celebrities have a negative duty of testimonial justice not to undermine trust in authoritative sources by spreading misinformation or directing attention to untrustworthy sources. Moreover, celebrities have a general imperfect duty to try to correct for an unjust distribution of attention by redirecting it to those who deserve it. During a pandemic this may become a perfect one, due to the harm that could be prevented if people follow the advice of experts. Relatedly, we argue that celebrities have an imperfect duty to promote behavior that will reduce the spread of a pandemic. We outline three ways they might do so: they might take on the position of a role model, they may act as a salience magnet or they can direct people’s attention towards others who have taken on these roles.
Henschke, Adam
When Enhancements Need Therapy: Disenhancements, Iatrogenesis, and the Responsibility of Military Institutions Journal Article
In: Monash Bioethics Review, vol. 41, pp. 6-21, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Disenhancement., Enhancements, Moral responsibility, PTSD
@article{nokey,
title = {When Enhancements Need Therapy: Disenhancements, Iatrogenesis, and the Responsibility of Military Institutions },
author = {Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s40592-022-00169-1/},
doi = {10.1007/s40592-022-00169-1},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-22},
urldate = {2022-12-22},
journal = {Monash Bioethics Review},
volume = {41},
pages = {6-21},
keywords = {Disenhancement., Enhancements, Moral responsibility, PTSD},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Dennis, Matthew
Designing for Digital Well-Being: A New Vision for Engineering Ethics Book Chapter
In: Rocco, Roberto; Thomas, Amy; Novas-Ferrádas, Mariá (Ed.): 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Design for values, Digital well-being, Teaching
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Designing for Digital Well-Being: A New Vision for Engineering Ethics},
author = {Matthew Dennis},
editor = {Roberto Rocco and Amy Thomas and Mariá Novas-Ferrádas},
doi = {10.34641/mg.54},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-08},
urldate = {2022-12-08},
keywords = {Design for values, Digital well-being, Teaching},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Danaher, John; Hopster, Jeroen
The normative significance of future moral revolutions Journal Article
In: Futures, vol. 144, no. 103046, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics, Futurism, Moral change, Moral revolution, Normativity, Technology
@article{nokey,
title = {The normative significance of future moral revolutions},
author = {John Danaher and Jeroen Hopster},
doi = {10.1016/j.futures.2022.103046 },
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-07},
urldate = {2022-12-07},
journal = {Futures},
volume = {144},
number = {103046},
keywords = {Ethics, Futurism, Moral change, Moral revolution, Normativity, Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
de Boer, Bas; te Molder, Hedwig; Verbeek, Peter-Paul
‘Braining’ psychiatry: an investigation into how complexity is managed in the practice of neuropsychiatric research Journal Article
In: BioSocieties, vol. 17, pp. 758-781, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Complexity, Conversation analysis, Diagnostic categories, Ethnomethodology, Neuropsychiatry, Technological mediation theory
@article{nokey,
title = {‘Braining’ psychiatry: an investigation into how complexity is managed in the practice of neuropsychiatric research},
author = {Bas de Boer and Hedwig te Molder and Peter-Paul Verbeek},
doi = {10.1057/s41292-021-00242-8},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-01},
urldate = {2022-12-01},
journal = {BioSocieties},
volume = {17},
pages = {758-781},
keywords = {Complexity, Conversation analysis, Diagnostic categories, Ethnomethodology, Neuropsychiatry, Technological mediation theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hopster, Jeroen
Science and Speciesism Book Chapter
In: Kneeland, Timothy W. (Ed.): Routledge, 1, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Species, Speciesism
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Science and Speciesism},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
editor = {Timothy W. Kneeland},
doi = {10.4324/9781003112396},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-01},
urldate = {2022-12-01},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
keywords = {Species, Speciesism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Erden, Yasemin J.; Brey, Philip
Ethics guidelines for human enhancement R&D Journal Article
In: Science, vol. 378, iss. 6622, pp. 835-838, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics guidelines, Human enhancement, Research and development
@article{nokey,
title = {Ethics guidelines for human enhancement R&D},
author = {Yasemin J. Erden and Philip Brey},
doi = {10.1126/science.add9079},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-24},
urldate = {2022-11-24},
journal = {Science},
volume = {378},
issue = {6622},
pages = {835-838},
keywords = {Ethics guidelines, Human enhancement, Research and development},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Blok, Vincent
Regeneratieve technologie Journal Article
In: Uil van Minerva, vol. 35, iss. 4, pp. 283-289, 2022.
BibTeX | Tags: Regenerative design
@article{nokey,
title = {Regeneratieve technologie},
author = {Vincent Blok},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-24},
urldate = {2022-11-24},
journal = {Uil van Minerva},
volume = {35},
issue = {4},
pages = {283-289},
keywords = {Regenerative design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hopster, Jeroen
Moreel dilemma: moeten we zorgverleners wel vervangen door robots? Journal Article
In: Filosofie Magazine, vol. 12, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Care Robots, Healthcare, Moral dilemmas
@article{nokey,
title = {Moreel dilemma: moeten we zorgverleners wel vervangen door robots?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/is-het-een-goed-idee-om-zorgverleners-te-vervangen-door-zorgrobots/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-18},
urldate = {2022-11-18},
journal = {Filosofie Magazine},
volume = {12},
keywords = {Care Robots, Healthcare, Moral dilemmas},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
de Wildt, Tristan; van de Poel, Ibo; Chappin, Emile J. L.
Tracing Long-term Value Change in (Energy) Technologies: Opportunities of Probabilistic Topic Models Using Large Data Sets Journal Article
In: Science, Technology, & Human Values , vol. 47, iss. 3, pp. 429-458, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Energy technologies, Value change
@article{nokey,
title = {Tracing Long-term Value Change in (Energy) Technologies: Opportunities of Probabilistic Topic Models Using Large Data Sets},
author = {Tristan de Wildt and Ibo van de Poel and Emile J. L. Chappin},
doi = {10.1177/01622439211054439},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-08},
urldate = {2022-11-08},
journal = {Science, Technology, & Human Values },
volume = {47},
issue = {3},
pages = {429-458},
keywords = {Energy technologies, Value change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Nyholm, Sven
A new control problem? Humanoid robots, artificial intelligence, and the value of control Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Extended agency, Humanoid robots, Self-control, The control problem
@article{nokey,
title = {A new control problem? Humanoid robots, artificial intelligence, and the value of control},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-022-00231-y},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-07},
urldate = {2022-11-07},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Extended agency, Humanoid robots, Self-control, The control problem},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hopster, Jeroen
Moreel dilemma: moeten we inzetten op kernenergie? Journal Article
In: Filosofie Magazine, vol. 11-2022, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral dilemmas, Nuclear energy technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Moreel dilemma: moeten we inzetten op kernenergie?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/moeten-we-inzetten-op-kernenergie/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-21},
urldate = {2022-10-21},
journal = {Filosofie Magazine},
volume = {11-2022},
keywords = {Moral dilemmas, Nuclear energy technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
O'Neill, Elizabeth; Klincewicz, Michal; Kemmer, Michiel
Ethical Issues with Artificial Ethics Assistants Book Chapter
In: Véliz, Carissa (Ed.): Oxford Academic, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial ethics advisor, Artificial ethics assistant, Artificial intelligence, Moral cognition, Moral decision-making, Moral enhancement
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Ethical Issues with Artificial Ethics Assistants},
author = {Elizabeth O'Neill and Michal Klincewicz and Michiel Kemmer},
editor = {Carissa Véliz},
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.17},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-20},
urldate = {2022-10-20},
publisher = {Oxford Academic},
keywords = {Artificial ethics advisor, Artificial ethics assistant, Artificial intelligence, Moral cognition, Moral decision-making, Moral enhancement},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Gwagwa, Arthur
Rethinking normative status necessary for self-determination in the era of sentient artificial agents Journal Article
In: Can an AI be sentient? Multiple perspectives on sentience and on the potential ethical implications of the rise of sentient AI, no. 30-35, 2022.
BibTeX | Tags: Normative status, Self-determination
@article{nokey,
title = {Rethinking normative status necessary for self-determination in the era of sentient artificial agents},
author = {Arthur Gwagwa},
editor = {E. R. Goffi and A. Momcilovic},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-18},
urldate = {2022-10-18},
journal = {Can an AI be sentient? Multiple perspectives on sentience and on the potential ethical implications of the rise of sentient AI},
number = {30-35},
keywords = {Normative status, Self-determination},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}