2023
Aizenberg, Evgeni; Dennis, Matthew; van den Hoven, Jeroen
Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation Journal Article
In: AI & Society, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation
@article{Aizenberg2023,
title = {Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation},
author = {Evgeni Aizenberg and Matthew Dennis and Jeroen van den Hoven},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/examining-the-assumptions-of-ai/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01783-1},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-21},
urldate = {2023-10-21},
journal = {AI & Society},
abstract = {In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.},
keywords = {AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.
Sullivan, Emily
Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets? Journal Article
In: Philosophy of Sciences, pp. 1-11, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Epistemology, Machine learning
@article{Sullivan2023,
title = {Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets?},
author = {Emily Sullivan},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/do-machine-learning-models-represent-their-targets/},
doi = {0.1017/psa.2023.151},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-20},
urldate = {2023-10-20},
journal = {Philosophy of Sciences},
pages = {1-11},
abstract = {I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.},
keywords = {Epistemology, Machine learning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.
Hopster, Jeroen; Löhr, Guido
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology , vol. 36, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2023,
title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-18},
urldate = {2023-10-18},
journal = { Philosophy & Technology },
volume = {36},
abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},
keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.
Klenk, Michael; van de Poel, Ibo
Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement Journal Article
In: Erkenntnis, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement
@article{Klenk2023,
title = {Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement},
author = {Michael Klenk and Ibo van de Poel},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-a-good-fix/},
doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-13},
urldate = {2023-10-13},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
abstract = {We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.},
keywords = {Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.
Lundgren, Björn
Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy? Journal Article
In: Res Publica, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing
@article{Lundgren2023b,
title = {Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy?},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-lack-of-literature-engagement-a-reason-for-rejecting-a-paper-in-philosophy/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-10},
urldate = {2023-10-10},
journal = {Res Publica},
abstract = {Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.},
keywords = {Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.
Nickel, Philip; Loosman, Iris; Frank, Lily; Vinnikova, Anna
Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities Journal Article
In: Digital Society, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization
@article{Nickel2023b,
title = {Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities},
author = {Philip Nickel and Iris Loosman and Lily Frank and Anna Vinnikova },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s44206-023-00075-x/},
doi = {10.1007/s44206-023-00075-x },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-10},
urldate = {2023-10-10},
journal = {Digital Society},
abstract = {The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.},
keywords = {Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.
van der Weij, Freek; Steinert, Steffen; van Poel, Ibo; Alleblas, Joost; Melnyk, Anna; de Wildt, Tristan; Abbink, David; Almeida, Denise
Value Change and Technological Design Journal Article
In: IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, vol. 42, pp. 25-32, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design
@article{vanderWeij2023,
title = {Value Change and Technological Design},
author = {Freek van der Weij and Steffen Steinert and Ibo van Poel and Joost Alleblas and Anna Melnyk and Tristan de Wildt and David Abbink and Denise Almeida},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/value_change_and_technological_design/},
doi = {10.1109/MTS.2023.3302406},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-22},
urldate = {2023-09-22},
journal = {IEEE Technology and Society Magazine},
volume = {42},
pages = {25-32},
abstract = {Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).},
keywords = {Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).
van de Poel, Ibo; Sand, Martin
Responsibility beyond Control Book Section
In: Placani, Adriana; Broadhead, Stearns (Ed.): pp. 31-50, Routledge, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: increase control, Moral agency, reciprocal relation
@incollection{vandePoel2023c,
title = {Responsibility beyond Control},
author = {Ibo van de Poel and Martin Sand},
editor = {Adriana Placani and Stearns Broadhead},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/responsibility-beyond-control/},
doi = {10.4324/9781003276029-3},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-15},
urldate = {2023-09-15},
pages = {31-50},
publisher = {Routledge},
chapter = {302},
abstract = {Traditionally, control is seen as a precondition for responsibility. We are not, and cannot reasonably be held, responsible for things that are beyond our control. This seems to explain, for example, why we are not responsible for natural hazards or so-called acts of God. At the same time, it seems to explain why, as nature is increasingly under human control in the technological age, we acquire new responsibilities as our span of control increases. Against this traditional view, this chapter explores whether there can also be cases in which responsibility precedes control. More specifically, the chapter suggests that we can take or assume responsibility for things that are still beyond our control, and that with the motivation to assume forward-looking responsibility usually comes the impetus to increase control, otherwise the set responsibilities cannot be fulfilled. The chapter discusses under which conditions it may be reasonable to take responsibility for certain risks beyond our control, and whether it may sometimes be morally required to take responsibility for risks beyond our control. Instead of seeing control as necessarily preceding responsibility, the resulting picture is one in which responsibility and control have a reciprocal relation. This chapter illuminates that this reciprocal relation might best be understood via the underlying notion of moral agency.},
keywords = {increase control, Moral agency, reciprocal relation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Traditionally, control is seen as a precondition for responsibility. We are not, and cannot reasonably be held, responsible for things that are beyond our control. This seems to explain, for example, why we are not responsible for natural hazards or so-called acts of God. At the same time, it seems to explain why, as nature is increasingly under human control in the technological age, we acquire new responsibilities as our span of control increases. Against this traditional view, this chapter explores whether there can also be cases in which responsibility precedes control. More specifically, the chapter suggests that we can take or assume responsibility for things that are still beyond our control, and that with the motivation to assume forward-looking responsibility usually comes the impetus to increase control, otherwise the set responsibilities cannot be fulfilled. The chapter discusses under which conditions it may be reasonable to take responsibility for certain risks beyond our control, and whether it may sometimes be morally required to take responsibility for risks beyond our control. Instead of seeing control as necessarily preceding responsibility, the resulting picture is one in which responsibility and control have a reciprocal relation. This chapter illuminates that this reciprocal relation might best be understood via the underlying notion of moral agency.
Malinverno, Luca; Barros, Vesna; Ghisoni, Francesco; Visonà, Giovanni; Kern, Roman; Nickel, Philip; Ventura, Barbara; Šimić, Ilija; Stryeck, Sarah; Manni, Francesca; Ferri, Cesar; Jean-Quartier, Claire; Genga, Laura; Schweikert, Gabriele; Lovrić, Mario; Rosen-Zvi, Michal
A historical perspective of biomedical explainable AI research Journal Article
In: Patterns, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Corona virus, COVID-19, Decision-making, Explainability, Foundation models, Machine learning, Meta-review, PRISMA, Trustworthiness
@article{Malinverno2023,
title = {A historical perspective of biomedical explainable AI research},
author = {Luca Malinverno and Vesna Barros and Francesco Ghisoni and Giovanni Visonà and Roman Kern and Philip Nickel and Barbara Ventura and Ilija Šimić and Sarah Stryeck and Francesca Manni and Cesar Ferri and Claire Jean-Quartier and Laura Genga and Gabriele Schweikert and Mario Lovrić and Michal Rosen-Zvi},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/1-s2-0-s266638992300199x-main/},
doi = {10.1016/j.patter.2023.100830 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-08},
urldate = {2023-09-08},
journal = {Patterns},
abstract = {The black-box nature of most artificial intelligence (AI) models encourages the development of explainability methods to engender trust into the AI decision-making process. Such methods can be broadly categorized into two main types: post hoc explanations and inherently interpretable algorithms. We aimed at analyzing the possible associations between COVID-19 and the push of explainable AI (XAI) to the forefront of biomedical research. We automatically extracted from the PubMed database biomedical XAI studies related to concepts of causality or explainability and manually labeled 1,603 papers with respect to XAI categories. To compare the trends pre- and post-COVID-19, we fit a change point detection model and evaluated significant changes in publication rates. We show that the advent of COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020 could be the driving factor behind an increased focus concerning XAI, playing a crucial role in accelerating an already evolving trend. Finally, we present a discussion with future societal use and impact of XAI technologies and potential future directions for those who pursue fostering clinical trust with interpretable machine learning models.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Corona virus, COVID-19, Decision-making, Explainability, Foundation models, Machine learning, Meta-review, PRISMA, Trustworthiness},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The black-box nature of most artificial intelligence (AI) models encourages the development of explainability methods to engender trust into the AI decision-making process. Such methods can be broadly categorized into two main types: post hoc explanations and inherently interpretable algorithms. We aimed at analyzing the possible associations between COVID-19 and the push of explainable AI (XAI) to the forefront of biomedical research. We automatically extracted from the PubMed database biomedical XAI studies related to concepts of causality or explainability and manually labeled 1,603 papers with respect to XAI categories. To compare the trends pre- and post-COVID-19, we fit a change point detection model and evaluated significant changes in publication rates. We show that the advent of COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020 could be the driving factor behind an increased focus concerning XAI, playing a crucial role in accelerating an already evolving trend. Finally, we present a discussion with future societal use and impact of XAI technologies and potential future directions for those who pursue fostering clinical trust with interpretable machine learning models.
van de Poel, Ibo; Frank, Lily; Hermann, Julia; Hopster, Jeroen; Lenzi, Dominic; Nyholm, Sven; Taebi, Behnam; Ziliotti, Elena (Ed.)
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction Book
Open Book Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, artificial wombs, Climate engineering, Social media, Social robots, Society, Technology
@book{vandePoel2023,
title = {Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction},
editor = {Ibo van de Poel and Lily Frank and Julia Hermann and Jeroen Hopster and Dominic Lenzi and Sven Nyholm and Behnam Taebi and Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0366},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
publisher = {Open Book Publishers},
abstract = {Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and our relation to nature?
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, artificial wombs, Climate engineering, Social media, Social robots, Society, Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and our relation to nature?
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.
Bovenkerk, Bernice; Boersma, Keje
Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs Journal Article
In: Environmental Ethics, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 381-402, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives
@article{Bovenkerk2023,
title = {Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs},
author = {Bernice Bovenkerk and Keje Boersma},
doi = {10.5840/enviroethics202382964},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
journal = {Environmental Ethics},
volume = {45},
number = {4},
pages = {381-402},
abstract = {In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
Hopster, Jeroen; Brey, Philip; Klenk, Michael; Löhr, Guido; Marchiori, Samuela; Lundgren, Björn; Scharp, Kevin
Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology Book Chapter
In: van de Poel, Ibo; Frank, Lily; Hermann, Julia; Hopster, Jeroen; Lenzi, Dominic; Nyholm, Sven; Taebi, Behnam; Ziliotti, Elena (Ed.): Chapter 6, pp. 141–162, Open Book Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@inbook{Hopster2023c,
title = {Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Philip Brey and Michael Klenk and Guido Löhr and Samuela Marchiori and Björn Lundgren and Kevin Scharp},
editor = {Ibo van de Poel and Lily Frank and Julia Hermann and Jeroen Hopster and Dominic Lenzi and Sven Nyholm and Behnam Taebi and Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0366.06},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
pages = {141–162},
publisher = {Open Book Publishers},
chapter = {6},
abstract = {This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large.
Ziliotti, Elena; Benavides, Patricia Reyes; Gwagwa, Arthur; Dennis, Matthew
Social Media and Democracy Book Chapter
In: van de Poel, Ibo; Frank, Lily; Hermann, Julia; Hopster, Jeroen; Lenzi, Dominic; Nyholm, Sven; Taebi, Behnam; Ziliotti, Elena (Ed.): pp. 33-52, Open Book Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Democracy, Social media
@inbook{Ziliotti2023b,
title = {Social Media and Democracy},
author = {Elena Ziliotti and Patricia Reyes Benavides and Arthur Gwagwa and Matthew Dennis},
editor = {Ibo van de Poel and Lily Frank and Julia Hermann and Jeroen Hopster and Dominic Lenzi and Sven Nyholm and Behnam Taebi and Elena Ziliotti},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/obp-0366-02/},
doi = {10.11647/obp.0366.02},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
pages = {33-52},
publisher = {Open Book Publishers},
abstract = {Has social media disrupted the concept of democracy? This complex question has become more pressing than ever as social media have become a ubiquitous part of democratic societies worldwide. This chapter discusses social media’s effects at three critical levels of democratic politics (personal relationships among democratic citizens, national politics, and international politics) and argues that social media pressures the conceptual limits of democracy. This new digital communication infrastructure challenges some of the fundamental elements of the concept of democracy. By giving citizens and non-citizens equal substantive access to online political debates that shape the political agenda, social media has drastically expanded and opened up the notion of demos and public sphere (the communicative space where citizens come together to form and exchange opinions and define collective problems), and misaligned the conceptual relationship of public sphere with the idea of demos. These conclusions have multiple implications. They indicate engineers’ and designers’ new political responsibility, novel normative challenges for research in political and moral philosophy, security and legal frameworks, and ultimately they shed light on how to do politics in digital democratic societies.},
keywords = {Democracy, Social media},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Has social media disrupted the concept of democracy? This complex question has become more pressing than ever as social media have become a ubiquitous part of democratic societies worldwide. This chapter discusses social media’s effects at three critical levels of democratic politics (personal relationships among democratic citizens, national politics, and international politics) and argues that social media pressures the conceptual limits of democracy. This new digital communication infrastructure challenges some of the fundamental elements of the concept of democracy. By giving citizens and non-citizens equal substantive access to online political debates that shape the political agenda, social media has drastically expanded and opened up the notion of demos and public sphere (the communicative space where citizens come together to form and exchange opinions and define collective problems), and misaligned the conceptual relationship of public sphere with the idea of demos. These conclusions have multiple implications. They indicate engineers’ and designers’ new political responsibility, novel normative challenges for research in political and moral philosophy, security and legal frameworks, and ultimately they shed light on how to do politics in digital democratic societies.
Verweij, Marcel; Ossebaard, Hans
Sustainability as an Intrinsic Moral Concern for Solidaristic Health Care Journal Article
In: Health Care Analysis, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate change, Environmental pollution, Environmental sustainability
@article{Verweij2023,
title = {Sustainability as an Intrinsic Moral Concern for Solidaristic Health Care},
author = {Marcel Verweij and Hans Ossebaard },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s10728-023-00469-5/},
doi = {10.1007/s10728-023-00469-5},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-04},
urldate = {2023-09-04},
journal = {Health Care Analysis},
abstract = {Environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change have adverse impacts on global health. Somewhat paradoxically, health care systems that aim to prevent and cure disease are themselves major emitters and polluters. In this paper we develop a justification for the claim that solidaristic health care systems should include sustainability as one of the criteria for determining which health interventions are made available or reimbursed – and which not. There is however a complication: most adverse health effects due to climate change do occur elsewhere in the world. If solidarity would commit us to take care of everyone’s health, worldwide, it might imply that solidaristic health system cannot justifiably restrict universal access to their own national populations. In response we explain health solidarity is to be considered as a moral ideal. Such an ideal does not specify what societies owe to whom, but it does have moral implications. We argue that ignoring sustainability in political decision making about what health care is to be offered, would amount to betrayal of the ideal of solidarity.},
keywords = {Climate change, Environmental pollution, Environmental sustainability},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change have adverse impacts on global health. Somewhat paradoxically, health care systems that aim to prevent and cure disease are themselves major emitters and polluters. In this paper we develop a justification for the claim that solidaristic health care systems should include sustainability as one of the criteria for determining which health interventions are made available or reimbursed – and which not. There is however a complication: most adverse health effects due to climate change do occur elsewhere in the world. If solidarity would commit us to take care of everyone’s health, worldwide, it might imply that solidaristic health system cannot justifiably restrict universal access to their own national populations. In response we explain health solidarity is to be considered as a moral ideal. Such an ideal does not specify what societies owe to whom, but it does have moral implications. We argue that ignoring sustainability in political decision making about what health care is to be offered, would amount to betrayal of the ideal of solidarity.
Bal, Michèlle; Stok, Marijn; Bombaerts, Gunter; Huijts, Nicole M. A.; Schneider, Philipp; Spahn, Andreas; Buskens, Vincent
A fairway to fairness: Toward a richer conceptualization of fairness perceptions for just energy transitions Journal Article
In: Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 103, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Behavioral game theory, Distributive fairness, Environmental justice, Fairness perceptions, Procedural fairness, Recognitive fairness
@article{nokey,
title = {A fairway to fairness: Toward a richer conceptualization of fairness perceptions for just energy transitions},
author = {Michèlle Bal and Marijn Stok and Gunter Bombaerts and Nicole M.A. Huijts and Philipp Schneider and Andreas Spahn and Vincent Buskens
},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/a-fairway-to-fairness-2/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103213},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-01},
urldate = {2023-09-01},
journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},
volume = {103},
abstract = {Current energy justice literature has developed a strong empirical approach to describe how justice plays a role in energy transitions. We argue that the individual-level perception measures are insufficiently developed within this field, while they are vital for a successful just energy transition. Reviewing studies on how people (citizens, users or consumers) perceive fairness in the context of the energy transition, we first investigate how fairness perceptions are currently studied within energy social science. Subsequently, we look into social and environmental justice research and interdependent decision-experiments, to map potential extensions of fairness conceptualizations and measures. Following the triumvirate model of energy justice – distinguishing distributive, procedural, and recognitive justice – we found that only recently studies also contained recognition justice aspects, while the majority of energy social science studies focuses on either distributive or procedural aspects. Extending these insights, we argue that environmental justice research provides a potential way of specifying groups to be recognized in the energy transition (i.e., future generations, non-human species, humans worldwide). Moreover, we propose that interactional justice could be an additional tenet of citizen's fairness perceptions to consider. Importantly, for a successful global energy transition, in-depth insight into the principles underlying people's justice judgments is necessary. Social justice theorizing and interdependent decision-experiments offer concrete ways of tapping into these principles. Interdependent decision-experiments in particular pose a way of measuring fairness tendencies that could be applied to the specific context of the energy transition and be expanded beyond the current research focus measuring distributive justice perceptions.},
keywords = {Behavioral game theory, Distributive fairness, Environmental justice, Fairness perceptions, Procedural fairness, Recognitive fairness},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Current energy justice literature has developed a strong empirical approach to describe how justice plays a role in energy transitions. We argue that the individual-level perception measures are insufficiently developed within this field, while they are vital for a successful just energy transition. Reviewing studies on how people (citizens, users or consumers) perceive fairness in the context of the energy transition, we first investigate how fairness perceptions are currently studied within energy social science. Subsequently, we look into social and environmental justice research and interdependent decision-experiments, to map potential extensions of fairness conceptualizations and measures. Following the triumvirate model of energy justice – distinguishing distributive, procedural, and recognitive justice – we found that only recently studies also contained recognition justice aspects, while the majority of energy social science studies focuses on either distributive or procedural aspects. Extending these insights, we argue that environmental justice research provides a potential way of specifying groups to be recognized in the energy transition (i.e., future generations, non-human species, humans worldwide). Moreover, we propose that interactional justice could be an additional tenet of citizen's fairness perceptions to consider. Importantly, for a successful global energy transition, in-depth insight into the principles underlying people's justice judgments is necessary. Social justice theorizing and interdependent decision-experiments offer concrete ways of tapping into these principles. Interdependent decision-experiments in particular pose a way of measuring fairness tendencies that could be applied to the specific context of the energy transition and be expanded beyond the current research focus measuring distributive justice perceptions.
Hille, Eva Maria; Hummel, Patrik; Braun, Matthias
Meaningful Human Control over AI for Health? A Review Journal Article
In: BMJ Journals, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Meaningful human control, Self-determination
@article{nokey,
title = {Meaningful Human Control over AI for Health? A Review},
author = {Eva Maria Hille and Patrik Hummel and Matthias Braun},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/meaningful-human-control-over-ai-for-health/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-27},
urldate = {2022-08-27},
journal = {BMJ Journals},
abstract = {Artificial intelligence is currently changing many areas of society. Especially in health, where critical decisions are made, questions of control must be renegotiated: who is in control when an automated system makes clinically relevant decisions? Increasingly, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) is being invoked for this purpose. However, it is unclear exactly how this concept is to be understood in health. Through a systematic review, we present the current state of the concept of MHC in health. The results show that there is not yet a robust MHC concept for health. We propose a broader understanding of MHC along three strands of action: enabling, exercising and evaluating control. Taking into account these strands of action and the established rules and processes in the different health sectors, the MHC concept needs to be further developed to avoid falling into two gaps, which we have described as theoretical and labelling gaps.},
keywords = {Meaningful human control, Self-determination},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Artificial intelligence is currently changing many areas of society. Especially in health, where critical decisions are made, questions of control must be renegotiated: who is in control when an automated system makes clinically relevant decisions? Increasingly, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) is being invoked for this purpose. However, it is unclear exactly how this concept is to be understood in health. Through a systematic review, we present the current state of the concept of MHC in health. The results show that there is not yet a robust MHC concept for health. We propose a broader understanding of MHC along three strands of action: enabling, exercising and evaluating control. Taking into account these strands of action and the established rules and processes in the different health sectors, the MHC concept needs to be further developed to avoid falling into two gaps, which we have described as theoretical and labelling gaps.
Bombaerts, Gunter; Spahn, Andreas; Laes, Erik
Structuring values and normative frameworks using Schwartz's value theory to map the three tenets of energy justice Journal Article
In: Energy Research & Social Science, vol. 104, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Energy justice, Justification, Normative framework, Shalom Schwartz, Three-tenets framework, Value structure
@article{nokey,
title = {Structuring values and normative frameworks using Schwartz's value theory to map the three tenets of energy justice},
author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Andreas Spahn and Erik Laes },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/structuring-values-and-normative-framworks-using-schwartz-vaule-theory/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103244},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-10},
urldate = {2023-08-10},
journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},
volume = {104},
abstract = {Recent energy justice studies have explicitly introduced different normative frameworks. However, an elaboration of how these newly introduced normative frameworks relate to each other is missing in the energy justice literature. This could lead to false expectations that a specific normative framework could solve the normative challenges of energy justice. We indicate that normative frameworks embrace specific values and priority rules, but still lack an attempt to map out a general overall value structure of human and societal values in general. We introduce Shalom Schwartz's core value theory to propose a structure that allows us to map key values and their relation to energy justice. We illustrate that the three-tenets framework as such lacks normative guidance and show how Schwartz theory can be used to scaffold the three-tenets framework in dealing with underlying value disputes. The study concludes that Schwartz's theory proves useful in addressing the lack of a normative framework structure. The study indicates the individual approach as a key limitation and proposes further analyses towards a more collective approach.},
keywords = {Energy justice, Justification, Normative framework, Shalom Schwartz, Three-tenets framework, Value structure},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recent energy justice studies have explicitly introduced different normative frameworks. However, an elaboration of how these newly introduced normative frameworks relate to each other is missing in the energy justice literature. This could lead to false expectations that a specific normative framework could solve the normative challenges of energy justice. We indicate that normative frameworks embrace specific values and priority rules, but still lack an attempt to map out a general overall value structure of human and societal values in general. We introduce Shalom Schwartz's core value theory to propose a structure that allows us to map key values and their relation to energy justice. We illustrate that the three-tenets framework as such lacks normative guidance and show how Schwartz theory can be used to scaffold the three-tenets framework in dealing with underlying value disputes. The study concludes that Schwartz's theory proves useful in addressing the lack of a normative framework structure. The study indicates the individual approach as a key limitation and proposes further analyses towards a more collective approach.
Burke, Paul; Henschke, Adam
I Know My Truth… Now Tell Me Yours: From Active Measures To Cognitive Warfare In The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine Bachelor Thesis
2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Active measures, Cognitive warfare, Disinformation, Hybrid, NATO, PSYOPS, Ukraine invasion
@bachelorthesis{nokey,
title = {I Know My Truth… Now Tell Me Yours: From Active Measures To Cognitive Warfare In The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine},
author = {Paul Burke and Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/141-article-text-275-1-10-20230808/},
doi = {10.53679/2616-9460.2.2022.02},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-08},
journal = {Strategic Panorama},
abstract = {In recent years, international attention has been turned to the ways that states use disinformation to further their own political ends. Propaganda, information conflict and active measures have long been a tool of statecraft, but the parallel development of information and communication technologies with increased levels of internal discord and social tension within states have made such disinformation campaigns both more effective and more worrying. This paper provides a brief history of Soviet “active measures”, before examining the role of Russian disinformation and cognitive warfare in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The examination of this topic is not solely confined to a description of the methods used; it also highlights some of the ethical issues involved in Russia’s use of cognitive warfare and its heavy reliance on disinformation. Whereas information warfare focuses on controlling the flow of information, cognitive warfare instead has a more subtle yet potentially more damaging goal of shaping not simply what people think, but how they think and how they react to information. One of the significant features of the current conflict in Ukraine is the role that disinformation is playing in both driving and describing the conflict, and this paper explores the history and ethical implications of modern cognitive warfare, particularly in relation to the current conflict in Ukraine.},
keywords = {Active measures, Cognitive warfare, Disinformation, Hybrid, NATO, PSYOPS, Ukraine invasion},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {bachelorthesis}
}
In recent years, international attention has been turned to the ways that states use disinformation to further their own political ends. Propaganda, information conflict and active measures have long been a tool of statecraft, but the parallel development of information and communication technologies with increased levels of internal discord and social tension within states have made such disinformation campaigns both more effective and more worrying. This paper provides a brief history of Soviet “active measures”, before examining the role of Russian disinformation and cognitive warfare in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The examination of this topic is not solely confined to a description of the methods used; it also highlights some of the ethical issues involved in Russia’s use of cognitive warfare and its heavy reliance on disinformation. Whereas information warfare focuses on controlling the flow of information, cognitive warfare instead has a more subtle yet potentially more damaging goal of shaping not simply what people think, but how they think and how they react to information. One of the significant features of the current conflict in Ukraine is the role that disinformation is playing in both driving and describing the conflict, and this paper explores the history and ethical implications of modern cognitive warfare, particularly in relation to the current conflict in Ukraine.
Löhr, Guido
Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 74, no. 102327, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-01},
urldate = {2023-08-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {74},
number = {102327},
abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.
Laes, Erik; Bombaerts, Gunter; Spahn, Andreas
Towards a Pragmatic and Pluralist Framework for Energy Justice Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 36, no. 53, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Boltanski and Thévenot, Energy justice, Justification, Orders of worth, Three tenets
@article{nokey,
title = {Towards a Pragmatic and Pluralist Framework for Energy Justice},
author = {Erik Laes and Gunter Bombaerts and Andreas Spahn },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/towards-a-pragmatic-and-pluralist-framework-for-energy-justice/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00654-3},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-31},
urldate = {2023-07-31},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {36},
number = {53},
abstract = {The three-tenet model, which focuses on ‘distributional justice’, ‘procedural justice’, and ‘justice as recognition’, has emerged as the most influential framework in the field of energy justice. Based on critical reviews of the three-tenet model, we identify three challenges that the model currently still faces: (i) a normative challenge on the grounding of the three-tenet model in philosophical theories; (ii) an ‘elite’ challenge on the justification of the use of power in energy-related decision; and (iii) a practical challenge on the application of the three tenets in situations of conflicting justice demands. In this article, we provide the basic contours of a three-step pluralist and pragmatic dialogue model for questions of energy justice that addresses the three challenges, based on the ‘commonwealth model’ of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. The model proposes to create moral legitimacy in the face of plural demands for energy justice by engaging actors in an inclusive dialogue based on an explicit recognition of Boltanski and Thévenot’s commonwealth model. We thereby make three contributions to the existing literature on energy justice. First, the commonwealth model’s rootedness in normative political theory provides a stronger philosophical underpinning than was available up till now in the literature (challenge 1). Second, it allows one to go beyond the (almost exclusive) focus on injustices perpetrated on disempowered or marginalised groups, to include questions on the justified exercise of power (challenge 2). Third, the commonwealth model shows us practical ways out of situations where conflicting demands for justice are being made (challenge 3).},
keywords = {Boltanski and Thévenot, Energy justice, Justification, Orders of worth, Three tenets},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The three-tenet model, which focuses on ‘distributional justice’, ‘procedural justice’, and ‘justice as recognition’, has emerged as the most influential framework in the field of energy justice. Based on critical reviews of the three-tenet model, we identify three challenges that the model currently still faces: (i) a normative challenge on the grounding of the three-tenet model in philosophical theories; (ii) an ‘elite’ challenge on the justification of the use of power in energy-related decision; and (iii) a practical challenge on the application of the three tenets in situations of conflicting justice demands. In this article, we provide the basic contours of a three-step pluralist and pragmatic dialogue model for questions of energy justice that addresses the three challenges, based on the ‘commonwealth model’ of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. The model proposes to create moral legitimacy in the face of plural demands for energy justice by engaging actors in an inclusive dialogue based on an explicit recognition of Boltanski and Thévenot’s commonwealth model. We thereby make three contributions to the existing literature on energy justice. First, the commonwealth model’s rootedness in normative political theory provides a stronger philosophical underpinning than was available up till now in the literature (challenge 1). Second, it allows one to go beyond the (almost exclusive) focus on injustices perpetrated on disempowered or marginalised groups, to include questions on the justified exercise of power (challenge 2). Third, the commonwealth model shows us practical ways out of situations where conflicting demands for justice are being made (challenge 3).
Bollen, Caroline
Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy Journal Article
In: Social Epistemology, vol. 37, pp. 637-655, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autism, Empathy, Epistemic injustice, Neurodiversity
@article{nokey,
title = {Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/towards-a-clear-and-fair-conceptualization-of-empathy/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2227963},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-26},
journal = {Social Epistemology},
volume = {37},
pages = {637-655},
abstract = {Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.},
keywords = {Autism, Empathy, Epistemic injustice, Neurodiversity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.
Löhr, Guido
Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind Journal Article
In: Mind and Language, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Abstract concepts, Psychology
@article{nokey,
title = {Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12473},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-20},
urldate = {2023-07-20},
journal = {Mind and Language},
abstract = {Many psychologists currently assume that there is a psychologically real distinction to be made between concepts that are abstract and concepts that are concrete. It is for example largely agreed that concepts and words are more easily processed if they are concrete. Moreover, it is assumed that this is because these words and concepts are concrete. It is thought that interesting generalizations can be made about certain concepts because they are concrete. I argue that we have surprisingly little reason to believe that the abstract-concrete distinction is psychologically real.},
keywords = {Abstract concepts, Psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Many psychologists currently assume that there is a psychologically real distinction to be made between concepts that are abstract and concepts that are concrete. It is for example largely agreed that concepts and words are more easily processed if they are concrete. Moreover, it is assumed that this is because these words and concepts are concrete. It is thought that interesting generalizations can be made about certain concepts because they are concrete. I argue that we have surprisingly little reason to believe that the abstract-concrete distinction is psychologically real.
Löhr, Guido
Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism Journal Article
In: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, vol. 4, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds
@article{nokey,
title = {Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.33735/phimisci.2023.9632},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-19},
urldate = {2023-07-19},
journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},
volume = {4},
abstract = {Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.},
keywords = {Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.
Löhr, Guido; Michel, Christian
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem Journal Article
In: Mind and Language, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem},
author = {Guido Löhr and Christian Michel},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12471},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-18},
urldate = {2023-07-18},
journal = {Mind and Language},
abstract = {According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.
Hopster, Jeroen; Maas, Matthijs
The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change
@article{nokey,
title = {The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Matthijs Maas },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-technology-triad/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00305-5 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-06-28},
urldate = {2023-06-28},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).
Fraaije, Aafke; van der Meij, Marjoleine; Vermeeren, Arnold; Kupper, Frank; Broerse, Jacqueline
Creating room for citizen perspectives in ‘smart city’ Amsterdam through interactive theatre Journal Article
In: vol. 7, no. 1, 2023, ISSN: 2399-8121.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: General Medicine
@article{Fraaije2023,
title = {Creating room for citizen perspectives in ‘smart city’ Amsterdam through interactive theatre},
author = {Aafke Fraaije and Marjoleine van der Meij and Arnold Vermeeren and Frank Kupper and Jacqueline Broerse},
doi = {10.14324/rfa.07.1.05},
issn = {2399-8121},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-23},
urldate = {2023-05-23},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
publisher = {UCL Press},
abstract = {The ‘smart city’ vision is popular, but it lacks citizen perspectives. The aim of this study was to gain insight into whether and how art-based citizen engagement can create more room for citizen perspectives in smart cities by developing and testing an art-based citizen engagement project in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. To that end, a combination of interactive theatre, interaction design and social research methods was used to bring together diverse publics and innovation professionals for joint exploration of increased dataveillance in cities. The events were studied through observations, and through interviews with participants and organisers. Data analysis was guided by the outcomes, processes and challenges of the responsible innovation dimensions: inclusion, reflexivity, anticipation and responsiveness (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The most important achievements of art-based citizen engagement were: engaging people who would not have engaged with the topic otherwise, encouraging participants to question common phrases and assumptions, exploring future social implications of technologies, and staging meaningful interactions between citizens and professionals. The most significant challenge was to involve citizens in a way that could influence innovation trajectories.},
keywords = {General Medicine},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The ‘smart city’ vision is popular, but it lacks citizen perspectives. The aim of this study was to gain insight into whether and how art-based citizen engagement can create more room for citizen perspectives in smart cities by developing and testing an art-based citizen engagement project in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. To that end, a combination of interactive theatre, interaction design and social research methods was used to bring together diverse publics and innovation professionals for joint exploration of increased dataveillance in cities. The events were studied through observations, and through interviews with participants and organisers. Data analysis was guided by the outcomes, processes and challenges of the responsible innovation dimensions: inclusion, reflexivity, anticipation and responsiveness (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The most important achievements of art-based citizen engagement were: engaging people who would not have engaged with the topic otherwise, encouraging participants to question common phrases and assumptions, exploring future social implications of technologies, and staging meaningful interactions between citizens and professionals. The most significant challenge was to involve citizens in a way that could influence innovation trajectories.
Löhr, Guido
If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism
@article{nokey,
title = {If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-023-00295-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-16},
urldate = {2023-05-16},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.},
keywords = {AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.
Verweij, Marcel; Pierik, Roland
Overheid moet soms interveniëren in publiek debat Miscellaneous
2023.
@misc{nokey,
title = {Overheid moet soms interveniëren in publiek debat},
author = {Marcel Verweij and Roland Pierik},
url = {https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/02/overheid-moet-soms-intervenieren-in-publiek-debat-a4163559},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-02},
urldate = {2023-05-02},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {misc}
}
Sand, Martin; Hofbauer, Benjamin; Alleblas, Joost
Techno-fixing non-compliance - Geoengineering, ideal theory and residual responsibility Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 73, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate change, Geoengineering, Ideal Theory, Non-compliance, Responsibility, Tecno-fix
@article{nokey,
title = {Techno-fixing non-compliance - Geoengineering, ideal theory and residual responsibility},
author = {Martin Sand and Benjamin Hofbauer and Joost Alleblas},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/techno-fixing-non-compliance-2/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102236},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-01},
urldate = {2023-05-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {73},
abstract = {After years of missing the agreed upon goals for carbon reduction, we might conclude that global climate policies set infeasible standards to halt climate change. The widespread non-compliance of many signees with frameworks such as the Paris Agreement indicates that these frameworks were too optimistic regarding the signees’ motivation to act. One of the suggested ways out of this impasse, is geoengineering, which is seen as a “techno-fix” of the non-compliance problem, relieving signees and other actors of some, or most, of their mitigation duties. This paper scrutinizes different approaches towards climate mitigation that focus on behavioral change or on technological solutions. We argue that these different approaches do not originate from categorically different theories of climate justice. Indeed, seemingly realistic and seemingly idealistic proposals do not disagree on the substance of climate justice, but about what is to be considered feasible. Furthermore, by applying this dialectic lens on ideal vs. non-ideal theorizing in the context of climate justice, we show that (backward-looking) residual responsibility is an overlooked aspect of geoengineering as a (forward-looking) non-ideal approach to achieve climate justice. We will outline three possible consequences of this moral residue: 1) Residual responsibility can provide grounds to demand compensation, 2) it can constitute other forward-looking responsibilities (e.g., the maintenance of geoengineering technologies) and 3) it provides a reason to employ other techno-fixes equal in effectiveness and risks that do not sidestep the problem of non-compliance.},
keywords = {Climate change, Geoengineering, Ideal Theory, Non-compliance, Responsibility, Tecno-fix},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
After years of missing the agreed upon goals for carbon reduction, we might conclude that global climate policies set infeasible standards to halt climate change. The widespread non-compliance of many signees with frameworks such as the Paris Agreement indicates that these frameworks were too optimistic regarding the signees’ motivation to act. One of the suggested ways out of this impasse, is geoengineering, which is seen as a “techno-fix” of the non-compliance problem, relieving signees and other actors of some, or most, of their mitigation duties. This paper scrutinizes different approaches towards climate mitigation that focus on behavioral change or on technological solutions. We argue that these different approaches do not originate from categorically different theories of climate justice. Indeed, seemingly realistic and seemingly idealistic proposals do not disagree on the substance of climate justice, but about what is to be considered feasible. Furthermore, by applying this dialectic lens on ideal vs. non-ideal theorizing in the context of climate justice, we show that (backward-looking) residual responsibility is an overlooked aspect of geoengineering as a (forward-looking) non-ideal approach to achieve climate justice. We will outline three possible consequences of this moral residue: 1) Residual responsibility can provide grounds to demand compensation, 2) it can constitute other forward-looking responsibilities (e.g., the maintenance of geoengineering technologies) and 3) it provides a reason to employ other techno-fixes equal in effectiveness and risks that do not sidestep the problem of non-compliance.
Dennis, Matthew; Ziliotti, Elena
Living Well Together Online: Digital Wellbeing from a Confucian Perspective Journal Article
In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 40, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Confucian perspective, Digital well-being
@article{nokey,
title = {Living Well Together Online: Digital Wellbeing from a Confucian Perspective},
author = {Matthew Dennis and Elena Ziliotti},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-applied-philosophy-2022-dennis-living-well-together-online-digital-wellbeing-from-a-confucian-perspective/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12627},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-01},
urldate = {2023-05-01},
journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
volume = {40},
abstract = {The impact of social media technologies (SMTs) on digital wellbeing has become an increasingly important puzzle for ethicists of technology. In this article, we explain why individualised theories of digital wellbeing (DWB) can only solve part of this puzzle. While an individualised conception of DWB is useful for understanding online self-regulation, we contend that we must seek greater understanding of how SMTs connect us. To build an account of this, we locate the conceptual resources for our account in Confucian ethics. In contrast to individualised conceptions of human flourishing that are found in the Western tradition, Confucian thinkers strongly emphasise that individuals cannot flourish alone, but need wider social structures (partner, family, society, nation). Not only do strands of Confucian ethics explain how individuals are defined by the roles they take up in relationships, but this perspective also makes practical suggestions for how these roles can be cultivated. We conclude our article by identifying the Confucian notions that seem to have most promise for the future design of SMTs.},
keywords = {Confucian perspective, Digital well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The impact of social media technologies (SMTs) on digital wellbeing has become an increasingly important puzzle for ethicists of technology. In this article, we explain why individualised theories of digital wellbeing (DWB) can only solve part of this puzzle. While an individualised conception of DWB is useful for understanding online self-regulation, we contend that we must seek greater understanding of how SMTs connect us. To build an account of this, we locate the conceptual resources for our account in Confucian ethics. In contrast to individualised conceptions of human flourishing that are found in the Western tradition, Confucian thinkers strongly emphasise that individuals cannot flourish alone, but need wider social structures (partner, family, society, nation). Not only do strands of Confucian ethics explain how individuals are defined by the roles they take up in relationships, but this perspective also makes practical suggestions for how these roles can be cultivated. We conclude our article by identifying the Confucian notions that seem to have most promise for the future design of SMTs.
van de Poel, Ibo
AI, Control and Unintended Consequences: The Need for Meta-Values Book Section
In: Fritzsche, Albrecht; Santa-María, Andrés (Ed.): pp. 117-129, Springer, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Experimentation, Machine ethics, Machine learning, Unintended consequences, Value sensitive design, Values
@incollection{nokey,
title = {AI, Control and Unintended Consequences: The Need for Meta-Values},
author = {Ibo van de Poel},
editor = {Albrecht Fritzsche and Andrés Santa-María},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ai-control-and-unintended/},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-25233-4_9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-29},
pages = {117-129},
publisher = {Springer},
abstract = {Due to their self-learning and evolutionary character, AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems are more prone to unintended consequences and more difficult to control than traditional sociotechnical systems. To deal with this, machine ethicists have proposed to build moral (reasoning) capacities into AI systems by designing artificial moral agents. I argue that this may well lead to more, rather than less, unintended consequences and may decrease, rather than increase, human control over such systems. Instead, I suggest, we should bring AI systems under meaningful human control by formulating a number of meta-values for their evolution. Amongst others, this requires responsible experimentation with AI systems, which may neither guarantee full control nor the prevention of all undesirable consequences, but nevertheless ensures that AI systems, and their evolution, do not get out of control.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Experimentation, Machine ethics, Machine learning, Unintended consequences, Value sensitive design, Values},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Due to their self-learning and evolutionary character, AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems are more prone to unintended consequences and more difficult to control than traditional sociotechnical systems. To deal with this, machine ethicists have proposed to build moral (reasoning) capacities into AI systems by designing artificial moral agents. I argue that this may well lead to more, rather than less, unintended consequences and may decrease, rather than increase, human control over such systems. Instead, I suggest, we should bring AI systems under meaningful human control by formulating a number of meta-values for their evolution. Amongst others, this requires responsible experimentation with AI systems, which may neither guarantee full control nor the prevention of all undesirable consequences, but nevertheless ensures that AI systems, and their evolution, do not get out of control.
Swart, Jac; van de Poel, Ibo
Corporate social responsibility and hybrid potato breeding Book Section
In: pp. 141-160, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Corporate Social Responsibility, HTPS-technology, Responsible research and innovation, sustainable development goals
@incollection{nokey,
title = {Corporate social responsibility and hybrid potato breeding},
author = {Jac Swart and Ibo van de Poel},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/swart-van-de-poel-2023-chapter-9-corporate-social-responsibility-and-hybrid-potato-breeding-balancing-economic/},
doi = {10.3920/978-90-8686-946-6_9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-17},
urldate = {2023-04-17},
pages = {141-160},
publisher = {Wageningen Academic Publishers},
abstract = {Hybrid potato breeding is an emerging technology that can have a strong impact on the potato sector by replacing seed potatoes with true seeds. The Netherlands is a world leader in certified seed potatoes and a number of Dutch companies play a pivotal role in the development of this technology. This implies a certain responsibility for the consequences and conditions of its implementation and we therefore explored how Dutch potato breeding companies see their role and responsibility especially in low- and middle-income countries in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From interviews, it appears that most potato breeding companies emphasise the promising role of hybrid potato breeding in achieving SDGs. They also stress that their core business is at the heart of corporate social responsibility as it contributes to the SDGs. We also observed that for the introduction of new varieties they often rely on trickle-down mechanisms, where local farmers are rather passive recipients, rather than being actively involved in strategic choices of innovation. It may explain why the concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which emphasises the active involvement of society and affected stakeholders, is relatively unknown in the sector. The main approach in the sector may be labelled as a ‘solution strategy’ where dominant actors rely on their expertise to solve problems. However, the attainment of SDGs should rather be considered as a wicked problem, characterised by complexity, uncertainty and multiple actor’s perspectives. A ‘negotiation strategy’, which is more inclusive and stresses the need of negotiation between different perspectives and interests, may fit better. From the perspective of RRI it is argued that insights from participatory breeding and farmer variety selection traditions and the concept of benefit sharing may be considered as promising negotiation strategies that can contribute to potato breeding practices for the attainment of SDGs.},
keywords = {Corporate Social Responsibility, HTPS-technology, Responsible research and innovation, sustainable development goals},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Hybrid potato breeding is an emerging technology that can have a strong impact on the potato sector by replacing seed potatoes with true seeds. The Netherlands is a world leader in certified seed potatoes and a number of Dutch companies play a pivotal role in the development of this technology. This implies a certain responsibility for the consequences and conditions of its implementation and we therefore explored how Dutch potato breeding companies see their role and responsibility especially in low- and middle-income countries in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From interviews, it appears that most potato breeding companies emphasise the promising role of hybrid potato breeding in achieving SDGs. They also stress that their core business is at the heart of corporate social responsibility as it contributes to the SDGs. We also observed that for the introduction of new varieties they often rely on trickle-down mechanisms, where local farmers are rather passive recipients, rather than being actively involved in strategic choices of innovation. It may explain why the concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI), which emphasises the active involvement of society and affected stakeholders, is relatively unknown in the sector. The main approach in the sector may be labelled as a ‘solution strategy’ where dominant actors rely on their expertise to solve problems. However, the attainment of SDGs should rather be considered as a wicked problem, characterised by complexity, uncertainty and multiple actor’s perspectives. A ‘negotiation strategy’, which is more inclusive and stresses the need of negotiation between different perspectives and interests, may fit better. From the perspective of RRI it is argued that insights from participatory breeding and farmer variety selection traditions and the concept of benefit sharing may be considered as promising negotiation strategies that can contribute to potato breeding practices for the attainment of SDGs.
Archer, Alfred; Dennis, Matthew
Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes Journal Article
In: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Aesthetic normativity, Moral demandingness, Moral exemplars, Obligation, Supererogation
@article{nokey,
title = {Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes},
author = {Alfred Archer and Matthew Dennis},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/exemplars-and-expertise-what-we-cannot-learn-from-saints-and-heroes/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2196681},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-08},
journal = { Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy},
abstract = {According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not.},
keywords = {Aesthetic normativity, Moral demandingness, Moral exemplars, Obligation, Supererogation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not.
Hopster, Jeroen
Disruptieve technologie Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 4-5, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Disruptive technology
@article{nokey,
title = {Disruptieve technologie},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {4-5},
keywords = {Disruptive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
van Balen, Bouke; van Grunsven, Janna; Vansteensel, Mariska; IJsselsteijn, Wijnand
Brain Computer Interfaces Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 16-23, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Brain computer interfaces
@article{nokey,
title = {Brain Computer Interfaces},
author = {Bouke van Balen and Janna van Grunsven and Mariska Vansteensel and Wijnand IJsselsteijn},
url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {16-23},
keywords = {Brain computer interfaces},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Royakkers, Lambèr
Augmented Reality Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap, vol. 63, iss. 1, pp. 24-33, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Augmented Reality},
author = {Lambèr Royakkers},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/augmented-reality/
},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap},
volume = {63},
issue = {1},
pages = {24-33},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Jacobs, Naomi
Disruptie: De Kunstmatige Baarmoeder en het idee van (goed) moederschap Journal Article
In: Wijsgerig Perspectief, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 7-15, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: artificial wombs
@article{nokey,
title = {Disruptie: De Kunstmatige Baarmoeder en het idee van (goed) moederschap},
author = {Naomi Jacobs},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/de-kunstmatige-baarmoeder/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-01},
urldate = {2023-04-01},
journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},
volume = {63},
number = {1},
pages = {7-15},
keywords = {artificial wombs},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Bombaerts, Gunter; Anderson, Joel; Dennis, Matthew; Gerola, Alessio; Frank, Lily; Hannes, Tom; Hopster, Jeroen; Marin, Lavinia; Spahn, Andreas
Attention as Practice Journal Article
In: glob. Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2023, ISSN: 2948-1538.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology
@article{Bombaerts2023b,
title = {Attention as Practice},
author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Joel Anderson and Matthew Dennis and Alessio Gerola and Lily Frank and Tom Hannes and Jeroen Hopster and Lavinia Marin and Andreas Spahn},
doi = {10.1007/s10516-023-09680-4},
issn = {2948-1538},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-00},
urldate = {2023-04-00},
journal = {glob. Philosophy},
volume = {33},
number = {2},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.},
keywords = {Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.
Wieners, Claudia; Hofbauer, Benjamin; Vries, Iris De; Honegger, Matthias; Visioni, Daniele; Russchenberg, Hermann; Felgenhauer, Tyler
Solar radiation modification is risky, but so is rejecting it: a call for balanced research Journal Article
In: Oxford Open Climate Change, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate change, Climate mitigation
@article{nokey,
title = {Solar radiation modification is risky, but so is rejecting it: a call for balanced research },
author = {Claudia Wieners and Benjamin Hofbauer and Iris De Vries and Matthias Honegger and Daniele Visioni and Hermann Russchenberg and Tyler Felgenhauer},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/solar-radiation/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfclm/kgad002},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-20},
urldate = {2023-03-20},
journal = {Oxford Open Climate Change},
keywords = {Climate change, Climate mitigation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Asin-Garcia, Enrique; Robaey, Zoë; Kampers, Linde; dos Santos, Vitor Martins
Exploring the Impact of Tensions in Stakeholder Norms on Designing for Value Change: The Case of Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology Journal Article
In: Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 29, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biosafety, Genetic safeguards, Industrial biotechnology, Multistakeholder approach, Safe-by-design framework, Value sensitive design
@article{nokey,
title = {Exploring the Impact of Tensions in Stakeholder Norms on Designing for Value Change: The Case of Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology},
author = {Enrique Asin-Garcia and Zoë Robaey and Linde Kampers and Vitor Martins dos Santos },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s11948-023-00432-6/},
doi = {10.1007/s11948-023-00432-6},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-07},
urldate = {2023-03-07},
journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics},
volume = {29},
abstract = {Synthetic biologists design and engineer organisms for a better and more sustainable future. While the manifold prospects are encouraging, concerns about the uncertain risks of genome editing affect public opinion as well as local regulations. As a consequence, biosafety and associated concepts, such as the Safe-by-design framework and genetic safeguard technologies, have gained notoriety and occupy a central position in the conversation about genetically modified organisms. Yet, as regulatory interest and academic research in genetic safeguard technologies advance, the implementation in industrial biotechnology, a sector that is already employing engineered microorganisms, lags behind. The main goal of this work is to explore the utilization of genetic safeguard technologies for designing biosafety in industrial biotechnology. Based on our results, we posit that biosafety is a case of a changing value, by means of further specification of how to realize biosafety. Our investigation is inspired by the Value Sensitive Design framework, to investigate scientific and technological choices in their appropriate social context. Our findings discuss stakeholder norms for biosafety, reasonings about genetic safeguards, and how these impact the practice of designing for biosafety. We show that tensions between stakeholders occur at the level of norms, and that prior stakeholder alignment is crucial for value specification to happen in practice. Finally, we elaborate in different reasonings about genetic safeguards for biosafety and conclude that, in absence of a common multi-stakeholder effort, the differences in informal biosafety norms and the disparity in biosafety thinking could end up leading to design requirements for compliance instead of for safety.},
keywords = {Biosafety, Genetic safeguards, Industrial biotechnology, Multistakeholder approach, Safe-by-design framework, Value sensitive design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Synthetic biologists design and engineer organisms for a better and more sustainable future. While the manifold prospects are encouraging, concerns about the uncertain risks of genome editing affect public opinion as well as local regulations. As a consequence, biosafety and associated concepts, such as the Safe-by-design framework and genetic safeguard technologies, have gained notoriety and occupy a central position in the conversation about genetically modified organisms. Yet, as regulatory interest and academic research in genetic safeguard technologies advance, the implementation in industrial biotechnology, a sector that is already employing engineered microorganisms, lags behind. The main goal of this work is to explore the utilization of genetic safeguard technologies for designing biosafety in industrial biotechnology. Based on our results, we posit that biosafety is a case of a changing value, by means of further specification of how to realize biosafety. Our investigation is inspired by the Value Sensitive Design framework, to investigate scientific and technological choices in their appropriate social context. Our findings discuss stakeholder norms for biosafety, reasonings about genetic safeguards, and how these impact the practice of designing for biosafety. We show that tensions between stakeholders occur at the level of norms, and that prior stakeholder alignment is crucial for value specification to happen in practice. Finally, we elaborate in different reasonings about genetic safeguards for biosafety and conclude that, in absence of a common multi-stakeholder effort, the differences in informal biosafety norms and the disparity in biosafety thinking could end up leading to design requirements for compliance instead of for safety.
Sparrow, Robert; Henschke, Adam
Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future Of Manned-Unmanned Teaming Journal Article
In: The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, vol. 53, no. 14, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autonomous weapon systems, Centaur warfighting, Ethics, Future force, Manned-unmanned teaming
@article{nokey,
title = {Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future Of Manned-Unmanned Teaming},
author = {Robert Sparrow and Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/minotaurs-not-centaurs_-the-future-of-manned-unmanned-teaming/},
doi = {10.55540/0031-1723.3207},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-03},
urldate = {2023-03-03},
journal = {The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters},
volume = {53},
number = {14},
abstract = {Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting.},
keywords = {Autonomous weapon systems, Centaur warfighting, Ethics, Future force, Manned-unmanned teaming},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting.
Kamphorst, Bart; Verweij, Marcel; van Zeben, Josephine
On the voluntariness of public health apps: a European case study on digital contact tracing Journal Article
In: Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 15, pp. 107-123, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Digital contract tracing, Liberty, Smart phone apps, Stigmatisation, Voluntariness
@article{nokey,
title = {On the voluntariness of public health apps: a European case study on digital contact tracing},
author = {Bart Kamphorst and Marcel Verweij and Josephine van Zeben},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/on-the-voluntariness-of-public-health-apps-a-european-case-study-on-digital-contact-tracing/},
doi = {10.1080/17579961.2023.2184137},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-03},
urldate = {2023-03-03},
journal = {Law, Innovation and Technology},
volume = {15},
pages = {107-123},
abstract = {As evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing reliance on smartphone apps such as digital contact tracing apps and vaccination passports to respond to and mitigate public health threats. In light of the European Commission's guidance, Member States typically offer such apps on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. In this paper, we question the extent to which the individual choice to use these apps – and similar future technologies – is indeed a voluntary one. By explicating ethical and legal considerations governing the choice situations surrounding the use of smartphone apps, specifically those related to the negative consequences that declining the use of these apps may have (e.g. loss of opportunities, social exclusion, stigma), we argue that the projected downsides of refusal may in effect limit the liberty to decline for certain subpopulations. To mitigate these concerns, we recommend three categories of approaches that may be employed by governments to safeguard voluntariness.},
keywords = {Digital contract tracing, Liberty, Smart phone apps, Stigmatisation, Voluntariness},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
As evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing reliance on smartphone apps such as digital contact tracing apps and vaccination passports to respond to and mitigate public health threats. In light of the European Commission's guidance, Member States typically offer such apps on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. In this paper, we question the extent to which the individual choice to use these apps – and similar future technologies – is indeed a voluntary one. By explicating ethical and legal considerations governing the choice situations surrounding the use of smartphone apps, specifically those related to the negative consequences that declining the use of these apps may have (e.g. loss of opportunities, social exclusion, stigma), we argue that the projected downsides of refusal may in effect limit the liberty to decline for certain subpopulations. To mitigate these concerns, we recommend three categories of approaches that may be employed by governments to safeguard voluntariness.
Zwier, Jochem; de Boer, Bas
Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene Journal Article
In: Environmental Humanities, vol. 15, iss. 1, pp. 64-68, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity
@article{nokey,
title = {Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene},
author = {Jochem Zwier and Bas de Boer},
doi = {10.1215/22011919-10216162},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Environmental Humanities},
volume = {15},
issue = {1},
pages = {64-68},
keywords = {Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Königs, Peter
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology Journal Article
In: Utilitas, vol. 35, iss. 1, pp. 70-87, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology
@article{nokey,
title = {Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology},
author = { Peter Königs},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000395},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Utilitas},
volume = {35},
issue = {1},
pages = {70-87},
abstract = {Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.},
keywords = {ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.
Lundgren, Björn
Two notes on Axiological Futurism Journal Article
In: Futures, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Axiological Futurism, Axiology, Disagreement, Value theory
@article{Lundgren2023c,
title = {Two notes on Axiological Futurism},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/two-notes-on-axiological-futurism/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103120},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-14},
urldate = {2023-02-14},
journal = {Futures},
abstract = {Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.},
keywords = {Axiological Futurism, Axiology, Disagreement, Value theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.
Michel, Christian; Löhr, Guido
Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply Journal Article
In: Cognitieve Science, vol. 47, iss. 2, no. e13249, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account
@article{nokey,
title = {Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply},
author = {Christian Michel and Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1111/cogs.13249},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-05},
urldate = {2023-02-05},
journal = {Cognitieve Science},
volume = {47},
number = {e13249},
issue = {2},
abstract = {In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.},
keywords = {Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.
Jacobs, Naomi; Evers, Jenneke
Ethical perspectives on femtech: Moving from concerns to capability‐sensitive designs Journal Article
In: Bioethics, vol. 37, pp. 430-439, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Capability Sensitive Design, Digital health technology, Ethics by design, femtech, fertility apps, period tracking
@article{nokey,
title = {Ethical perspectives on femtech: Moving from concerns to capability‐sensitive designs},
author = {Naomi Jacobs and Jenneke Evers},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Bioethics-2023-Jacobs-Ethical-perspectives-on-femtech-Moving-from-concerns-to-capability‐sensitive-designs.pdf},
doi = {10.1111/bioe.13148},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-03},
urldate = {2023-02-03},
journal = {Bioethics},
volume = {37},
pages = {430-439},
abstract = {Femtech is the collective name for technologies that address female health needs.
Femtech applications can help women digitally track their period, manage their
fertility, and support their pregnancy. Although femtech has beneficial potential,
there are various ethical concerns to be raised with current femtech apps. In this
article, we discuss three of the main ethical concerns with femtech apps regarding (1)
medical reliability, (2) privacy, and (3) gender stereotyping and epistemic injustice,
and we explore how Capability Sensitive Design, a novel design framework for
health and well‐being technologies, is able to mitigate these concerns and help
create morally sensitive femtech.},
keywords = {Capability Sensitive Design, Digital health technology, Ethics by design, femtech, fertility apps, period tracking},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Femtech is the collective name for technologies that address female health needs.
Femtech applications can help women digitally track their period, manage their
fertility, and support their pregnancy. Although femtech has beneficial potential,
there are various ethical concerns to be raised with current femtech apps. In this
article, we discuss three of the main ethical concerns with femtech apps regarding (1)
medical reliability, (2) privacy, and (3) gender stereotyping and epistemic injustice,
and we explore how Capability Sensitive Design, a novel design framework for
health and well‐being technologies, is able to mitigate these concerns and help
create morally sensitive femtech.
Femtech applications can help women digitally track their period, manage their
fertility, and support their pregnancy. Although femtech has beneficial potential,
there are various ethical concerns to be raised with current femtech apps. In this
article, we discuss three of the main ethical concerns with femtech apps regarding (1)
medical reliability, (2) privacy, and (3) gender stereotyping and epistemic injustice,
and we explore how Capability Sensitive Design, a novel design framework for
health and well‐being technologies, is able to mitigate these concerns and help
create morally sensitive femtech.
Lundgren, Björn
An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten Journal Article
In: Telecommunications Policy, vol. 47, iss. 1, no. 102446, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency
@article{nokey,
title = {An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
doi = {10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Telecommunications Policy},
volume = {47},
number = {102446},
issue = {1},
keywords = {Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
(Ed.)
Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach Collection
Springer, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Responsible research and innovation, RRI
@collection{Blok2023,
title = {Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach},
author = {Vincent Blok },
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-14710-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Responsible research and innovation, RRI},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {collection}
}
Löhr, Guido
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 72, no. 102160, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {72},
number = {102160},
abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.