2023
Kamphorst, Bart A.; Henschke, Adam
Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability Journal Article
In: Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 25, iss. 4, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance
@article{nokey,
title = {Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability },
author = {Bart A. Kamphorst and Adam Henschke},
doi = {10.1007/s10676-023-09732-8},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-16},
urldate = {2023-11-16},
journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
volume = {25},
issue = {4},
abstract = {The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.},
keywords = {Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.
Bollen, Caroline
A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research Journal Article
In: Methods in Psychology, vol. 8, no. 100109, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind
@article{nokey,
title = {A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
doi = {10.1016/j.metip.2022.100109},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-15},
urldate = {2023-11-15},
journal = {Methods in Psychology},
volume = {8},
number = {100109},
keywords = {Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
van de Poel, Ibo; Frank, Lily; Hermann, Julia; Hopster, Jeroen; Lenzi, Dominic; Nyholm, Sven; Taebi, Behnam; Ziliotti, Elena (Ed.)
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction Book
Open Book Publishers, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, artificial wombs, Climate engineering, Social media, Social robots, Society, Technology
@book{nokey,
title = {Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction},
editor = {Ibo van de Poel and Lily Frank and Julia Hermann and Jeroen Hopster and Dominic Lenzi and Sven Nyholm and Behnam Taebi and Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0366},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
publisher = {Open Book Publishers},
abstract = {Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and our relation to nature?
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, artificial wombs, Climate engineering, Social media, Social robots, Society, Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and our relation to nature?
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.
This book shows how technologies can be socially and conceptually disruptive and investigates how to come to terms with this disruptive potential.
Four technologies are studied: social media, social robots, climate engineering and artificial wombs. The authors highlight the disruptive potential of these technologies, and the new questions this raises. The book also discusses responses to conceptual disruption, like conceptual engineering, the deliberate revision of concepts.
Bovenkerk, Bernice; Boersma, Keje
Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs Journal Article
In: Environmental Ethics, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 381-402, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives
@article{nokey,
title = {Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs},
author = {Bernice Bovenkerk and Keje Boersma},
doi = {10.5840/enviroethics202382964},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
journal = {Environmental Ethics},
volume = {45},
number = {4},
pages = {381-402},
abstract = {In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
Löhr, Guido
Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 74, no. 102327, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-01},
urldate = {2023-08-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {74},
number = {102327},
abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.
Löhr, Guido
Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind Journal Article
In: Mind and Language, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Abstract concepts, Psychology
@article{nokey,
title = {Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12473},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-20},
urldate = {2023-07-20},
journal = {Mind and Language},
abstract = {Many psychologists currently assume that there is a psychologically real distinction to be made between concepts that are abstract and concepts that are concrete. It is for example largely agreed that concepts and words are more easily processed if they are concrete. Moreover, it is assumed that this is because these words and concepts are concrete. It is thought that interesting generalizations can be made about certain concepts because they are concrete. I argue that we have surprisingly little reason to believe that the abstract-concrete distinction is psychologically real.},
keywords = {Abstract concepts, Psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Many psychologists currently assume that there is a psychologically real distinction to be made between concepts that are abstract and concepts that are concrete. It is for example largely agreed that concepts and words are more easily processed if they are concrete. Moreover, it is assumed that this is because these words and concepts are concrete. It is thought that interesting generalizations can be made about certain concepts because they are concrete. I argue that we have surprisingly little reason to believe that the abstract-concrete distinction is psychologically real.
Löhr, Guido
Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism Journal Article
In: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, vol. 4, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds
@article{nokey,
title = {Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.33735/phimisci.2023.9632},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-19},
urldate = {2023-07-19},
journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},
volume = {4},
abstract = {Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.},
keywords = {Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.
Löhr, Guido; Michel, Christian
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem Journal Article
In: Mind and Language, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem},
author = {Guido Löhr and Christian Michel},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12471},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-18},
urldate = {2023-07-18},
journal = {Mind and Language},
abstract = {According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.
Fraaije, Aafke; van der Meij, Marjoleine; Vermeeren, Arnold; Kupper, Frank; Broerse, Jacqueline
Creating room for citizen perspectives in ‘smart city’ Amsterdam through interactive theatre Journal Article
In: vol. 7, no. 1, 2023, ISSN: 2399-8121.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: General Medicine
@article{Fraaije2023,
title = {Creating room for citizen perspectives in ‘smart city’ Amsterdam through interactive theatre},
author = {Aafke Fraaije and Marjoleine van der Meij and Arnold Vermeeren and Frank Kupper and Jacqueline Broerse},
doi = {10.14324/rfa.07.1.05},
issn = {2399-8121},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-23},
urldate = {2023-05-23},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
publisher = {UCL Press},
abstract = {The ‘smart city’ vision is popular, but it lacks citizen perspectives. The aim of this study was to gain insight into whether and how art-based citizen engagement can create more room for citizen perspectives in smart cities by developing and testing an art-based citizen engagement project in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. To that end, a combination of interactive theatre, interaction design and social research methods was used to bring together diverse publics and innovation professionals for joint exploration of increased dataveillance in cities. The events were studied through observations, and through interviews with participants and organisers. Data analysis was guided by the outcomes, processes and challenges of the responsible innovation dimensions: inclusion, reflexivity, anticipation and responsiveness (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The most important achievements of art-based citizen engagement were: engaging people who would not have engaged with the topic otherwise, encouraging participants to question common phrases and assumptions, exploring future social implications of technologies, and staging meaningful interactions between citizens and professionals. The most significant challenge was to involve citizens in a way that could influence innovation trajectories.},
keywords = {General Medicine},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The ‘smart city’ vision is popular, but it lacks citizen perspectives. The aim of this study was to gain insight into whether and how art-based citizen engagement can create more room for citizen perspectives in smart cities by developing and testing an art-based citizen engagement project in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. To that end, a combination of interactive theatre, interaction design and social research methods was used to bring together diverse publics and innovation professionals for joint exploration of increased dataveillance in cities. The events were studied through observations, and through interviews with participants and organisers. Data analysis was guided by the outcomes, processes and challenges of the responsible innovation dimensions: inclusion, reflexivity, anticipation and responsiveness (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The most important achievements of art-based citizen engagement were: engaging people who would not have engaged with the topic otherwise, encouraging participants to question common phrases and assumptions, exploring future social implications of technologies, and staging meaningful interactions between citizens and professionals. The most significant challenge was to involve citizens in a way that could influence innovation trajectories.
Löhr, Guido
If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism
@article{nokey,
title = {If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-023-00295-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-16},
urldate = {2023-05-16},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.},
keywords = {AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.
Bombaerts, Gunter; Anderson, Joel; Dennis, Matthew; Gerola, Alessio; Frank, Lily; Hannes, Tom; Hopster, Jeroen; Marin, Lavinia; Spahn, Andreas
Attention as Practice Journal Article
In: glob. Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2023, ISSN: 2948-1538.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology
@article{Bombaerts2023b,
title = {Attention as Practice},
author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Joel Anderson and Matthew Dennis and Alessio Gerola and Lily Frank and Tom Hannes and Jeroen Hopster and Lavinia Marin and Andreas Spahn},
doi = {10.1007/s10516-023-09680-4},
issn = {2948-1538},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-00},
urldate = {2023-04-00},
journal = {glob. Philosophy},
volume = {33},
number = {2},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {Abstract The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research. },
keywords = {Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.</jats:p>
Zwier, Jochem; de Boer, Bas
Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene Journal Article
In: Environmental Humanities, vol. 15, iss. 1, pp. 64-68, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity
@article{nokey,
title = {Earth Becomes World? Scientific Objects, Nonmodern Worlds, and the Metaphysics of the Anthropocene},
author = {Jochem Zwier and Bas de Boer},
doi = {10.1215/22011919-10216162},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Environmental Humanities},
volume = {15},
issue = {1},
pages = {64-68},
keywords = {Anthropocene, Earth system science, Modernity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Königs, Peter
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology Journal Article
In: Utilitas, vol. 35, iss. 1, pp. 70-87, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology
@article{nokey,
title = {Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology},
author = { Peter Königs},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000395},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-01},
urldate = {2023-03-01},
journal = {Utilitas},
volume = {35},
issue = {1},
pages = {70-87},
abstract = {Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.},
keywords = {ethics of self-driving cars, trolleyology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.
Michel, Christian; Löhr, Guido
Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply Journal Article
In: Cognitieve Science, vol. 47, iss. 2, no. e13249, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account
@article{nokey,
title = {Copredication and Complexity Revisited: Reply to Murphy's Reply},
author = {Christian Michel and Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1111/cogs.13249},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-05},
urldate = {2023-02-05},
journal = {Cognitieve Science},
volume = {47},
number = {e13249},
issue = {2},
abstract = {In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.},
keywords = {Complexity, Coprediction, mechanistic neurocognitive account},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy.
Lundgren, Björn
An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten Journal Article
In: Telecommunications Policy, vol. 47, iss. 1, no. 102446, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency
@article{nokey,
title = {An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
doi = {10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102446},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Telecommunications Policy},
volume = {47},
number = {102446},
issue = {1},
keywords = {Manipulation, Opacity, Privacy, Right to be forgotten, Right to privacy, Social norms, Transparency},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
(Ed.)
Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach Collection
Springer, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Responsible research and innovation, RRI
@collection{Blok2023,
title = {Putting Responsible Research and Innovation into Practice. A Multi-Stakeholder Approach},
author = {Vincent Blok },
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-14710-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Responsible research and innovation, RRI},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {collection}
}
Löhr, Guido
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 72, no. 102160, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {72},
number = {102160},
abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.
Fraaije, Aafke
2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Citizen engagement, Responsible Innovation, Smart City
@phdthesis{nokey,
title = {Can (sm)art save the city?: Lessons from action research on art-based citizen engagement towards responsible innovation in ‘smart city’Amsterdam},
author = {Aafke Fraaije},
doi = {10.5463/thesis.71},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
keywords = {Citizen engagement, Responsible Innovation, Smart City},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {phdthesis}
}
Remmers, Gaston; Hermann, Julia; Siebrand, Egbert; van Leersum, Catharina M.
Mind the Relationship: A Multi-Layered Ethical Framework for Citizen Science in Health Journal Article
In: Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics , vol. XXV, iss. 2, pp. 171-196, 2023.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Capabilities approach, care ethics, citizen science, health, Justice, participation
@article{nokey,
title = {Mind the Relationship: A Multi-Layered Ethical Framework for Citizen Science in Health},
author = {Gaston Remmers and Julia Hermann and Egbert Siebrand and Catharina M. van Leersum},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
journal = {Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics },
volume = {XXV},
issue = {2},
pages = {171-196},
abstract = {There is a heated debate about what citizen science is and is not. We argue that instead of aiming
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
},
keywords = {Capabilities approach, care ethics, citizen science, health, Justice, participation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There is a heated debate about what citizen science is and is not. We argue that instead of aiming
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our
practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that
consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between
equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for
different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two
fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic
practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the
existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as “extreme”.
The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach.
The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be
considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen
science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans.
The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.
Lundgren, Björn
In defense of ethical guidelines Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI Ethics, Ethical principles, Ethics guidelines
@article{nokey,
title = {In defense of ethical guidelines},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-022-00244-7},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-17},
urldate = {2023-01-17},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
keywords = {AI Ethics, Ethical principles, Ethics guidelines},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Nyholm, Sven
This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction Book
Wiley Blackwell, 2023, ISBN: 978-1-119-75557-9.
BibTeX | Tags: Ethics of Technology
@book{nokey,
title = {This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
isbn = {978-1-119-75557-9},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-05},
urldate = {2023-01-05},
publisher = {Wiley Blackwell},
keywords = {Ethics of Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Klein, Colin; Cheong, Marc; Ferreira, Marinus; Sullivan, Emily; Alfano, Mark
International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications, Springer, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Profiling Toolkit, Wisdom of the Crowds
@conference{nokey,
title = {The wisdom_of_crowds: An Efficient, Philosophically-Validated, Social Epistemological Network Profiling Toolkit},
author = {Colin Klein and Marc Cheong and Marinus Ferreira and Emily Sullivan and Mark Alfano},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-21127-0_6},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-04},
urldate = {2023-01-04},
booktitle = {International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications},
journal = {International Conference on Complex Networks and Their Applications},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Profiling Toolkit, Wisdom of the Crowds},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}
Nyholm, Sven
Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid Robots, and Old and New Control Problems Book Chapter
In: Hakli, R.; Mäkelä, P.; Seibt, J. (Ed.): pp. 3-12, IOS Press, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Humanoid robots, The control problem
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid Robots, and Old and New Control Problems},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
editor = {R. Hakli and P. Mäkelä and J. Seibt},
doi = {10.3233/FAIA220594},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-01},
urldate = {2023-01-01},
pages = {3-12},
publisher = {IOS Press},
abstract = {In this paper, I discuss what I call a new control problem related to AI in the form of humanoid robots, and I compare it to what I call the old control problem related to AI more generally. The old control problem – discussed by authors such as Alan Turing, Norbert Wiener, and Roman Yampolskiy – concerns a worry that we might lose control over advanced AI technologies, which is seen as something that would be instrumentally bad. The new control problem is that there might be certain types of AI technologies – in particular, AI technologies in the form of lifelike humanoid robots – where there might be something problematic, at least from a symbolic point of view, about wanting to completely control these robots. The reason for this is that such robots might be seen as symbolizing human persons and because wanting to control such robots might therefore be seen as symbolizing something non-instrumentally bad: persons controlling other persons. A more general statement of the new control problem is to say that it is the problem of describing under what circumstances having complete control over AI technologies is unambiguously good from an ethical point of view. This paper sketches an answer to this by also discussing AI technologies that do not take the form of humanoid robots and that are such that control over them can be conceptualized as a form of extended self-control.},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Humanoid robots, The control problem},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
In this paper, I discuss what I call a new control problem related to AI in the form of humanoid robots, and I compare it to what I call the old control problem related to AI more generally. The old control problem – discussed by authors such as Alan Turing, Norbert Wiener, and Roman Yampolskiy – concerns a worry that we might lose control over advanced AI technologies, which is seen as something that would be instrumentally bad. The new control problem is that there might be certain types of AI technologies – in particular, AI technologies in the form of lifelike humanoid robots – where there might be something problematic, at least from a symbolic point of view, about wanting to completely control these robots. The reason for this is that such robots might be seen as symbolizing human persons and because wanting to control such robots might therefore be seen as symbolizing something non-instrumentally bad: persons controlling other persons. A more general statement of the new control problem is to say that it is the problem of describing under what circumstances having complete control over AI technologies is unambiguously good from an ethical point of view. This paper sketches an answer to this by also discussing AI technologies that do not take the form of humanoid robots and that are such that control over them can be conceptualized as a form of extended self-control.
2022
Ziliotti, Elena
An Epistemic Case for Confucian Democracy Journal Article
In: Critical International Review of Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 1-23, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Confucian political meritocracy, Confucianism, Democratic participation, Epistemic democracy, Political participation, Well-being
@article{nokey,
title = {An Epistemic Case for Confucian Democracy},
author = {Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {10.1080/13698230.2020.1838736},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-31},
urldate = {2022-12-31},
journal = {Critical International Review of Social and Political Philosophy},
pages = {1-23},
keywords = {Confucian political meritocracy, Confucianism, Democratic participation, Epistemic democracy, Political participation, Well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Anderson, Joel
Scaffolding and Autonomy Book Chapter
In: Colburn, Ben (Ed.): Routledge, 1, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autonomy, Disability studies, Extended agency, Relational ethics
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Scaffolding and Autonomy},
author = {Joel Anderson},
editor = {Ben Colburn},
doi = {10.4324/9780429290411},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
series = {The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy},
keywords = {Autonomy, Disability studies, Extended agency, Relational ethics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Hermann, Julia
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 19-34, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty},
author = {Julia Hermann},
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {19-34},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
O'Hara, Neil; Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; Pleasants, Nigel
Introduction on Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 1-18, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Introduction on Moral Certainty},
author = {Neil O'Hara and Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Nigel Pleasants },
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {1-18},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
Bauer, Katharina; Hermann, Julia
Technomoral Resilience as a Goal of Moral Education Journal Article
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Care Robots, Disruption, Moral education, Moral imagination, Moral resilience, Technomoral Change
@article{nokey,
title = {Technomoral Resilience as a Goal of Moral Education},
author = {Katharina Bauer and Julia Hermann},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10353-1 },
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-24},
urldate = {2022-12-24},
journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
abstract = {In today’s highly dynamic societies, moral norms and values are subject to change. Moral change is partly driven by technological developments. For instance, the introduction of robots in elderly care practices requires caregivers to share moral responsibility with a robot (see van Wynsberghe 2013). Since we do not know what elements of morality will change and how they will change (see van der Burg 2003), moral education should aim at fostering what has been called “moral resilience” (Swierstra 2013). We seek to fill two gaps in the existing literature: (i) research on moral education has not paid enough attention to the development of moral resilience; (ii) the very limited literature on moral resilience does not conceptualise moral resilience in relation to new technological developments. We argue that philosophical accounts of moral education need to do justice to the importance of moral resilience, and that a specific form of moral resilience should be conceptualised as “technomoral resilience” to underline the added value of cultivating moral resilience in relation to technomoral change. We illustrate the role of technomoral resilience in practice by looking at the context of elderly care. To make the first step towards an account of how technomoral resilience can be fostered in moral education, we propose that moral education shall focus on a triangle of capacities: (1) moral imagination, (2) a capacity for critical reflection, and (3) a capacity for maintaining one’s moral agency in the face of disturbances.},
keywords = {Care Robots, Disruption, Moral education, Moral imagination, Moral resilience, Technomoral Change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In today’s highly dynamic societies, moral norms and values are subject to change. Moral change is partly driven by technological developments. For instance, the introduction of robots in elderly care practices requires caregivers to share moral responsibility with a robot (see van Wynsberghe 2013). Since we do not know what elements of morality will change and how they will change (see van der Burg 2003), moral education should aim at fostering what has been called “moral resilience” (Swierstra 2013). We seek to fill two gaps in the existing literature: (i) research on moral education has not paid enough attention to the development of moral resilience; (ii) the very limited literature on moral resilience does not conceptualise moral resilience in relation to new technological developments. We argue that philosophical accounts of moral education need to do justice to the importance of moral resilience, and that a specific form of moral resilience should be conceptualised as “technomoral resilience” to underline the added value of cultivating moral resilience in relation to technomoral change. We illustrate the role of technomoral resilience in practice by looking at the context of elderly care. To make the first step towards an account of how technomoral resilience can be fostered in moral education, we propose that moral education shall focus on a triangle of capacities: (1) moral imagination, (2) a capacity for critical reflection, and (3) a capacity for maintaining one’s moral agency in the face of disturbances.
Dennis, Matthew
Designing for Digital Well-Being: A New Vision for Engineering Ethics Book Chapter
In: Rocco, Roberto; Thomas, Amy; Novas-Ferrádas, Mariá (Ed.): 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Design for values, Digital well-being, Teaching
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Designing for Digital Well-Being: A New Vision for Engineering Ethics},
author = {Matthew Dennis},
editor = {Roberto Rocco and Amy Thomas and Mariá Novas-Ferrádas},
doi = {10.34641/mg.54},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-08},
urldate = {2022-12-08},
keywords = {Design for values, Digital well-being, Teaching},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Danaher, John; Hopster, Jeroen
The normative significance of future moral revolutions Journal Article
In: Futures, vol. 144, no. 103046, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics, Futurism, Moral change, Moral revolution, Normativity, Technology
@article{nokey,
title = {The normative significance of future moral revolutions},
author = {John Danaher and Jeroen Hopster},
doi = {10.1016/j.futures.2022.103046 },
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-07},
urldate = {2022-12-07},
journal = {Futures},
volume = {144},
number = {103046},
keywords = {Ethics, Futurism, Moral change, Moral revolution, Normativity, Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
de Boer, Bas; te Molder, Hedwig; Verbeek, Peter-Paul
‘Braining’ psychiatry: an investigation into how complexity is managed in the practice of neuropsychiatric research Journal Article
In: BioSocieties, vol. 17, pp. 758-781, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Complexity, Conversation analysis, Diagnostic categories, Ethnomethodology, Neuropsychiatry, Technological mediation theory
@article{nokey,
title = {‘Braining’ psychiatry: an investigation into how complexity is managed in the practice of neuropsychiatric research},
author = {Bas de Boer and Hedwig te Molder and Peter-Paul Verbeek},
doi = {10.1057/s41292-021-00242-8},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-01},
urldate = {2022-12-01},
journal = {BioSocieties},
volume = {17},
pages = {758-781},
keywords = {Complexity, Conversation analysis, Diagnostic categories, Ethnomethodology, Neuropsychiatry, Technological mediation theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hopster, Jeroen
Science and Speciesism Book Chapter
In: Kneeland, Timothy W. (Ed.): Routledge, 1, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Species, Speciesism
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Science and Speciesism},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
editor = {Timothy W. Kneeland},
doi = {10.4324/9781003112396},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-01},
urldate = {2022-12-01},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
keywords = {Species, Speciesism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Erden, Yasemin J.; Brey, Philip
Ethics guidelines for human enhancement R&D Journal Article
In: Science, vol. 378, iss. 6622, pp. 835-838, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics guidelines, Human enhancement, Research and development
@article{nokey,
title = {Ethics guidelines for human enhancement R&D},
author = {Yasemin J. Erden and Philip Brey},
doi = {10.1126/science.add9079},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-24},
urldate = {2022-11-24},
journal = {Science},
volume = {378},
issue = {6622},
pages = {835-838},
keywords = {Ethics guidelines, Human enhancement, Research and development},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Blok, Vincent
Regeneratieve technologie Journal Article
In: Uil van Minerva, vol. 35, iss. 4, pp. 283-289, 2022.
BibTeX | Tags: Regenerative design
@article{nokey,
title = {Regeneratieve technologie},
author = {Vincent Blok},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-24},
urldate = {2022-11-24},
journal = {Uil van Minerva},
volume = {35},
issue = {4},
pages = {283-289},
keywords = {Regenerative design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hopster, Jeroen
Moreel dilemma: moeten we zorgverleners wel vervangen door robots? Journal Article
In: Filosofie Magazine, vol. 12, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Care Robots, Healthcare, Moral dilemmas
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title = {Moreel dilemma: moeten we zorgverleners wel vervangen door robots?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/is-het-een-goed-idee-om-zorgverleners-te-vervangen-door-zorgrobots/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-18},
urldate = {2022-11-18},
journal = {Filosofie Magazine},
volume = {12},
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de Wildt, Tristan; van de Poel, Ibo; Chappin, Emile J. L.
Tracing Long-term Value Change in (Energy) Technologies: Opportunities of Probabilistic Topic Models Using Large Data Sets Journal Article
In: Science, Technology, & Human Values , vol. 47, iss. 3, pp. 429-458, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Energy technologies, Value change
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title = {Tracing Long-term Value Change in (Energy) Technologies: Opportunities of Probabilistic Topic Models Using Large Data Sets},
author = {Tristan de Wildt and Ibo van de Poel and Emile J. L. Chappin},
doi = {10.1177/01622439211054439},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-08},
urldate = {2022-11-08},
journal = {Science, Technology, & Human Values },
volume = {47},
issue = {3},
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tppubtype = {article}
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Nyholm, Sven
A new control problem? Humanoid robots, artificial intelligence, and the value of control Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Control, Extended agency, Humanoid robots, Self-control, The control problem
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title = {A new control problem? Humanoid robots, artificial intelligence, and the value of control},
author = {Sven Nyholm},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-022-00231-y},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-07},
urldate = {2022-11-07},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Control, Extended agency, Humanoid robots, Self-control, The control problem},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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Hopster, Jeroen
Moreel dilemma: moeten we inzetten op kernenergie? Journal Article
In: Filosofie Magazine, vol. 11-2022, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral dilemmas, Nuclear energy technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Moreel dilemma: moeten we inzetten op kernenergie?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.filosofie.nl/moeten-we-inzetten-op-kernenergie/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-21},
urldate = {2022-10-21},
journal = {Filosofie Magazine},
volume = {11-2022},
keywords = {Moral dilemmas, Nuclear energy technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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O'Neill, Elizabeth; Klincewicz, Michal; Kemmer, Michiel
Ethical Issues with Artificial Ethics Assistants Book Chapter
In: Véliz, Carissa (Ed.): Oxford Academic, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial ethics advisor, Artificial ethics assistant, Artificial intelligence, Moral cognition, Moral decision-making, Moral enhancement
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title = {Ethical Issues with Artificial Ethics Assistants},
author = {Elizabeth O'Neill and Michal Klincewicz and Michiel Kemmer},
editor = {Carissa Véliz},
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.17},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-20},
urldate = {2022-10-20},
publisher = {Oxford Academic},
keywords = {Artificial ethics advisor, Artificial ethics assistant, Artificial intelligence, Moral cognition, Moral decision-making, Moral enhancement},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
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Gwagwa, Arthur
Rethinking normative status necessary for self-determination in the era of sentient artificial agents Journal Article
In: Can an AI be sentient? Multiple perspectives on sentience and on the potential ethical implications of the rise of sentient AI, no. 30-35, 2022.
BibTeX | Tags: Normative status, Self-determination
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title = {Rethinking normative status necessary for self-determination in the era of sentient artificial agents},
author = {Arthur Gwagwa},
editor = {E. R. Goffi and A. Momcilovic},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-18},
urldate = {2022-10-18},
journal = {Can an AI be sentient? Multiple perspectives on sentience and on the potential ethical implications of the rise of sentient AI},
number = {30-35},
keywords = {Normative status, Self-determination},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Steinert, Steffen; Marin, Lavinia; Roeser, Sabine
Feeling and thinking on social media: emotions, affective scaffolding, and critical thinking Journal Article
In: Inquiry, pp. 1-22, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Affective niche, Affective scaffolding, Critical thinking, Emotions, Social media, Technical mediation
@article{nokey,
title = {Feeling and thinking on social media: emotions, affective scaffolding, and critical thinking},
author = {Steffen Steinert and Lavinia Marin and Sabine Roeser},
doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2022.2126148},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-14},
urldate = {2022-10-14},
journal = {Inquiry},
pages = {1-22},
keywords = {Affective niche, Affective scaffolding, Critical thinking, Emotions, Social media, Technical mediation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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Long, Thomas B.; Blok, Vincent
In: Blok, Vincent (Ed.): Chapter 13, pp. 249-272, Springer, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Agriculture, Responsibility, Sustainability
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Managing the Responsibilities of Doing Good and Avoiding Harm in Sustainability-Orientated Innovations: Example from Agri-Tech Start-Ups in the Netherlands},
author = {Thomas B. Long and Vincent Blok},
editor = {Vincent Blok},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-14710-4_13},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-14},
urldate = {2022-10-14},
pages = {249-272},
publisher = {Springer},
chapter = {13},
series = {Putting Responsible Research and Innovation in Practice: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach},
keywords = {Agriculture, Responsibility, Sustainability},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Popa, Eugen Octav; Blok, Vincent
Responsible innovation in the age of science conspiracism Journal Article
In: Journal of Responsible Innovation, vol. 9, iss. 3, pp. 398-418, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conspiracists, Responsible Innovation, Stakeholder inclusion, Thought experiments
@article{nokey,
title = {Responsible innovation in the age of science conspiracism},
author = {Eugen Octav Popa and Vincent Blok},
doi = {10.1080/23299460.2022.2116804},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-12},
urldate = {2022-10-12},
journal = {Journal of Responsible Innovation},
volume = {9},
issue = {3},
pages = {398-418},
keywords = {Conspiracists, Responsible Innovation, Stakeholder inclusion, Thought experiments},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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Marschalek, Ilse; Blok, Vincent; Bernstein, Michael J.; Braun, Robert; Cohen, Joshua; Hofer, Margit; Seebacher, Lisa M.; Unterfrauner, Elisabeth; Daimer, Stephanie; Nieminen, Mika; Christensen, Malene Vinther; Thapa, Raj Kumar
The social lab as a method for experimental engagement in participatory research Journal Article
In: Journal of Responsible Innovation, vol. 9, iss. 3, pp. 419-442, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Participatory research, Public engagement, RRI, Social labs
@article{nokey,
title = {The social lab as a method for experimental engagement in participatory research},
author = {Ilse Marschalek and Vincent Blok and Michael J. Bernstein and Robert Braun and Joshua Cohen and Margit Hofer and Lisa M. Seebacher and Elisabeth Unterfrauner and Stephanie Daimer and Mika Nieminen and Malene Vinther Christensen and Raj Kumar Thapa},
doi = {10.1080/23299460.2022.2119003},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-12},
urldate = {2022-10-12},
journal = {Journal of Responsible Innovation},
volume = {9},
issue = {3},
pages = {419-442},
keywords = {Participatory research, Public engagement, RRI, Social labs},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Maheshwari, Kritika; Nyholm, Sven
Dominating Risk Impositions Journal Article
In: The Journal of Ethics, vol. 26, pp. 613-637, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics, Risks
@article{nokey,
title = {Dominating Risk Impositions},
author = {Kritika Maheshwari and Sven Nyholm},
doi = {10.1007/s10892-022-09407-4},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-11},
urldate = {2022-10-11},
journal = {The Journal of Ethics},
volume = {26},
pages = {613-637},
keywords = {Ethics, Risks},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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Tromp, Nynke; Hekkert, Paul; Verbeek, Peter-Paul
Design für sozial verantwortliches Verhalten Book Chapter
In: Fineder, Martina; Lang, Johannes (Ed.): pp. 127-154, Springer VS Wiesbaden, 1, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Intended User Experience, Socially responsible behaviour
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title = {Design für sozial verantwortliches Verhalten},
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editor = {Martina Fineder and Johannes Lang},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-30269-6},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-01},
urldate = {2022-10-01},
pages = {127-154},
publisher = {Springer VS Wiesbaden},
edition = {1},
keywords = {Intended User Experience, Socially responsible behaviour},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
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Löhr, Guido
Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption Journal Article
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 25, pp. 835-849, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Communicative disruption, Concept creeps, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Linguistic intervention, Meaning
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title = {Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s10677-022-10321-9},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-09-24},
urldate = {2022-09-24},
journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
volume = {25},
pages = {835-849},
keywords = {Communicative disruption, Concept creeps, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Linguistic intervention, Meaning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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van de Poel, Ibo; Lammers, Vivian
Zijn we als maatschappij klaar voor de aankomende ‘technologische storm’? Journal Article
In: Scientias, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Technological storm
@article{nokey,
title = {Zijn we als maatschappij klaar voor de aankomende ‘technologische storm’?},
author = {Ibo van de Poel and Vivian Lammers},
url = { https://scientias.nl/zijn-we-als-maatschappij-klaar-voor-de-aankomende-technologische-storm/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-09-16},
urldate = {2022-09-16},
journal = {Scientias},
keywords = {Technological storm},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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Bergen, Jan Peter; Robaey, Zoë
Designing in Times of Uncertainty: What Virtue Ethics Can Bring to Engineering Ethics in the Twenty-First Century Book Chapter
In: Dennis, Matthew; Ishmaev, Georgy; Umbrello, Steven; van den Hoven, Jeroen (Ed.): pp. 163-183, Springer, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Design, Engineering ethics, Uncertainty, Virtue ethics
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title = {Designing in Times of Uncertainty: What Virtue Ethics Can Bring to Engineering Ethics in the Twenty-First Century},
author = {Jan Peter Bergen and Zoë Robaey},
editor = {Matthew Dennis and Georgy Ishmaev and Steven Umbrello and Jeroen van den Hoven},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08424-9_9},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-09-14},
pages = {163-183},
publisher = {Springer},
series = {Values for a Post-Pandemic Future},
keywords = {Design, Engineering ethics, Uncertainty, Virtue ethics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
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Ziliotti, Elena
What Has COVID-19 Taught Us About Democracy? Relational Democracy and Digital Surveillance Technologies Book Chapter
In: Dennis, Matthew; Ishmaev, Georgy; Umbrello, Steven; van den Hoven, Jeroen (Ed.): Springer, Values for a Post-Pandemic Future, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: COVID-19, Democracy, Digital surveillance
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title = {What Has COVID-19 Taught Us About Democracy? Relational Democracy and Digital Surveillance Technologies},
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editor = {Matthew Dennis and Georgy Ishmaev and Steven Umbrello and Jeroen van den Hoven},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08424-9_3},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-09-14},
urldate = {2022-09-14},
publisher = {Springer},
edition = {Values for a Post-Pandemic Future},
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