2023
Bovenkerk, Bernice; Boersma, Keje
Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs Journal Article
In: Environmental Ethics, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 381-402, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives
@article{nokey,
title = {Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs},
author = {Bernice Bovenkerk and Keje Boersma},
doi = {10.5840/enviroethics202382964},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-05},
urldate = {2023-09-05},
journal = {Environmental Ethics},
volume = {45},
number = {4},
pages = {381-402},
abstract = {In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular
technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is
exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.
The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is
how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption
of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential
implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.
Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it
is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the
development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of
these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.
It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need
to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.
Löhr, Guido
Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 74, no. 102327, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-01},
urldate = {2023-08-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {74},
number = {102327},
abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.
Löhr, Guido; Michel, Christian
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem Journal Article
In: Mind and Language, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology
@article{nokey,
title = {Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem},
author = {Guido Löhr and Christian Michel},
doi = {10.1111/mila.12471},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-18},
urldate = {2023-07-18},
journal = {Mind and Language},
abstract = {According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.},
keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.
Löhr, Guido
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 72, no. 102160, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {72},
number = {102160},
abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.