Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies

@article{nokey,

title = {Differential Disruption and Human Flourishing: Towards a Capability-Based Approach for Assessing Socially Disruptive Technologies},

author = {Giovanni Prins},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Differential-Disruption-and-Human-Flourishing.pdf},

doi = {10.1007/s11948-026-00635-7},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-10-24},

urldate = {2026-10-24},

journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics },

abstract = {While the concept of differential disruption has attracted growing attention in the ethics of technology, its normative dimensions remain underexplored. Current literature primarily uses differential disruption as a descriptive concept to highlight how Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) impact diversely situated groups differentially, but rarely interrogates the normative implications of these differential impacts. Building on recent calls to bring to the fore the normative potential of differential disruption, this paper argues that assessments of SDTs must move beyond analyses of epistemic injustice alone, and consider how epistemic injustices are deeply entangled with concerns of wellbeing and human flourishing. The paper shows that epistemic injustices generated by SDTs may constrain people’s access to resources and opportunities necessary for flourishing. It further argues that SDT development and assessment practices often rely on generalised assumptions about wellbeing that risk epistemically excluding marginalised modes of flourishing. Consequently, it argues that ethical assessments of SDTs require a heterogeneous and context-sensitive evaluative framework. To this end, the paper argues for a capability-based approach to the ethical assessment of SDTs. By centring what people are actually able to be and do, as well as attending to people’s diverse conversion factors that shape whether SDTs can be converted into valuable capabilities and functionings, a capability-based framework equips ethicists of technology with the conceptual tools to critically assess when, how, and for whom SDTs may be disruptive, while being sensitive to heterogeneous interpretations and experiences of flourishing.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Institutional Anthropomorphic Error},

author = {Giles Howdle},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Institutional-Anthropomorphic-Error.pdf},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-026-01191-5},

year  = {2026},

date = {2026-09-24},

urldate = {2026-09-24},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology },

volume = {39},

abstract = {Sakr proposes institutional anthropomorphic error (the projection of role-based authority onto AI systems that cannot bear a role’s constitutive obligations) as a third kind of error to be added to my distinction between metaphysical and pragmatic anthropomorphic error. I argue that the proposal is better understood as belonging to a second category of anthropomorphism than a third kind of error within an existing one. To ‘anthropomorphise’ a system may mean either seeing it as human-like (anthropomorphic cognition) or presenting it as human-like (anthropomorphic presentation). Metaphysical and pragmatic error are two kinds of error in anthropomorphic cognition; institutional anthropomorphic error, as Sakr defines it, is an error of presentation. A cognitive counterpart can be formulated, but it resolves into a distinctive form of either metaphysical or pragmatic error. Sakr’s contribution is valuable, but it does not require revision of the two-part account.



},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}