2024
Hopster, Jeroen
Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice Journal Article
In: Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 26, pp. 14, 2024, ISSN: 1572-8439.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2024,
title = {Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-hopster_socially-disruptve-technologies-and-epistemic-injustice-2/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09747-9},
issn = {1572-8439},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-27},
urldate = {2024-02-27},
journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
volume = {26},
pages = {14},
abstract = {Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.},
keywords = {Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.
2023
Bollen, Caroline
Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy Journal Article
In: Social Epistemology, vol. 37, pp. 637-655, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autism, Empathy, Epistemic injustice, Neurodiversity
@article{nokey,
title = {Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/towards-a-clear-and-fair-conceptualization-of-empathy/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2227963},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-26},
journal = {Social Epistemology},
volume = {37},
pages = {637-655},
abstract = {Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.},
keywords = {Autism, Empathy, Epistemic injustice, Neurodiversity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.
2022
van Grunsven, Janna
Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception Journal Article
In: Topoi, vol. 41, iss. 2, no. 287-298, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Autism, Bodily normativity, Enactivism, Epistemic injustice, Moral perception, Participatory sense-making, Sociotechnical embeddedness
@article{nokey,
title = {Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception},
author = {Janna van Grunsven},
doi = {10.1007/s11245-021-09767-w},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-04-01},
urldate = {2022-04-01},
journal = {Topoi},
volume = {41},
number = {287-298},
issue = {2},
keywords = {Autism, Bodily normativity, Enactivism, Epistemic injustice, Moral perception, Participatory sense-making, Sociotechnical embeddedness},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}