2023
Hannes, Tom; Bombaerts, Gunter
What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology Journal Article
In: The Anthropocene Review, vol. 10, iss. 3, pp. 771-786, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen
@article{nokey,
title = {What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology},
author = {Tom Hannes and Gunter Bombaerts},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/what-does-it-mean-that-all-is-aflame/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/205301962311539},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-01},
urldate = {2023-12-01},
journal = {The Anthropocene Review},
volume = {10},
issue = {3},
pages = {771-786},
abstract = {Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.},
keywords = {Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.
Bombaerts, Gunter; Anderson, Joel; Dennis, Matthew; Gerola, Alessio; Frank, Lily; Hannes, Tom; Hopster, Jeroen; Marin, Lavinia; Spahn, Andreas
Attention as Practice Journal Article
In: glob. Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2023, ISSN: 2948-1538.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology
@article{Bombaerts2023b,
title = {Attention as Practice},
author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Joel Anderson and Matthew Dennis and Alessio Gerola and Lily Frank and Tom Hannes and Jeroen Hopster and Lavinia Marin and Andreas Spahn},
doi = {10.1007/s10516-023-09680-4},
issn = {2948-1538},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-00},
urldate = {2023-04-00},
journal = {glob. Philosophy},
volume = {33},
number = {2},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.},
keywords = {Attention economy, Buddhism, Ethical practice, Persuasive technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.