2023
Löhr, Guido
If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism
@article{nokey,
title = {If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-023-00295-4},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-16},
urldate = {2023-05-16},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.},
keywords = {AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.
2022
van de Poel, Ibo; Kudina, Olya
Understanding Technology-Induced Value Change: a Pragmatist Proposal Journal Article
In: Philosophy and Technology, vol. 35, no. 40, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Dewey, Pragmatism, Techno-moral change, Technology, Value change, Values
@article{nokey,
title = {Understanding Technology-Induced Value Change: a Pragmatist Proposal},
author = {Ibo van de Poel and Olya Kudina},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-022-00520-8},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-04-15},
journal = {Philosophy and Technology},
volume = {35},
number = {40},
keywords = {Dewey, Pragmatism, Techno-moral change, Technology, Value change, Values},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
2021
Löhr, Guido
Commitment Engineering. Conceptual Engineering without Representations Journal Article
In: Synthese, vol. 199, iss. 5-6, pp. 13035-13052, 2021.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Commitments, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Meanings, Non-representationalism, Normativity, Pragmatism
@article{nokey,
title = {Commitment Engineering. Conceptual Engineering without Representations},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03365-4},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-01},
urldate = {2021-12-01},
journal = {Synthese},
volume = {199},
issue = {5-6},
pages = {13035-13052},
keywords = {Commitments, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Meanings, Non-representationalism, Normativity, Pragmatism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Klenk, Michael
Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity Journal Article
In: European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 19, 2021.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Constructivism, Expressivism, Moral objectivity, Pragmatism
@article{nokey,
title = {Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity},
author = {Michael Klenk},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ejpap-2677/},
doi = {10.4000/ejpap.2677},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-01},
urldate = {2021-01-01},
journal = {European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {19},
abstract = {Most non-robust-realist metaethical theories, such as expressivism, constructivism, and non-robust forms of realism, claim to retain a sense of objectivity in ethics. A persistent issue for these theories is to identify an objective criterion for moral truth that meets their objectivist aspiration.
Objectivist aspirations are often probed by confronting non-realists with abject normative positions, such as those of rational racists, which are licensed by the framework of the respective non-realist theory but nevertheless strike us a wrong. In such cases, non-realist theories face a dilemma. Either they allow that anything goes and thereby forgo their objectivist aspirations or they disallow abject normative positions. In the latter case, however, they have nothing to turn to but subjective criteria ultimately related to one’s personal outlook. This is unacceptably smug.
I argue that pragmatism in the spirit of Charles S. Peirce partially solves this dilemma. True belief would withstand experience and argument were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. I elucidate this notion and argue that pragmatist construal of moral truth provides a substantive, objective criterion to determine the truth value of moral claims, without recourse to subjective criteria. This puts pragmatism ahead of rival non-realist theories.},
keywords = {Constructivism, Expressivism, Moral objectivity, Pragmatism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Most non-robust-realist metaethical theories, such as expressivism, constructivism, and non-robust forms of realism, claim to retain a sense of objectivity in ethics. A persistent issue for these theories is to identify an objective criterion for moral truth that meets their objectivist aspiration.
Objectivist aspirations are often probed by confronting non-realists with abject normative positions, such as those of rational racists, which are licensed by the framework of the respective non-realist theory but nevertheless strike us a wrong. In such cases, non-realist theories face a dilemma. Either they allow that anything goes and thereby forgo their objectivist aspirations or they disallow abject normative positions. In the latter case, however, they have nothing to turn to but subjective criteria ultimately related to one’s personal outlook. This is unacceptably smug.
I argue that pragmatism in the spirit of Charles S. Peirce partially solves this dilemma. True belief would withstand experience and argument were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. I elucidate this notion and argue that pragmatist construal of moral truth provides a substantive, objective criterion to determine the truth value of moral claims, without recourse to subjective criteria. This puts pragmatism ahead of rival non-realist theories.
Objectivist aspirations are often probed by confronting non-realists with abject normative positions, such as those of rational racists, which are licensed by the framework of the respective non-realist theory but nevertheless strike us a wrong. In such cases, non-realist theories face a dilemma. Either they allow that anything goes and thereby forgo their objectivist aspirations or they disallow abject normative positions. In the latter case, however, they have nothing to turn to but subjective criteria ultimately related to one’s personal outlook. This is unacceptably smug.
I argue that pragmatism in the spirit of Charles S. Peirce partially solves this dilemma. True belief would withstand experience and argument were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. I elucidate this notion and argue that pragmatist construal of moral truth provides a substantive, objective criterion to determine the truth value of moral claims, without recourse to subjective criteria. This puts pragmatism ahead of rival non-realist theories.