2026
Anderson, Joel; Hopster, Jeroen; Lundgren, Björn
Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, 2026.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Collective action, Coping resources, Definition, Disorientation, Inequality, Social disruptive technologies, Technosocial disruption
@article{nokey,
title = {Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose},
author = {Joel Anderson and Jeroen Hopster and Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Articel-JA-JH-BL.pdf},
doi = {0.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103216},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-02-05},
journal = {Technology in Society},
abstract = {Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the examples we discuss are deepfakes, cultured meat, birth control technologies). This is the applied value of the framework we offer: to offer guidance in identifying which technologies require specific scrutiny as SDT, and guidance in identifying an initial set of ethical tools to accompany such analysis. Second, we reframe the ethics of social disruption by highlighting how SDTs pose challenges to capacities for normative orientation and joint action-coordination and by foregrounding the potentially stratified availability of the resources needed to overcome or mitigate these challenges. We argue that although the burdensome disruptiveness means that SDTs characteristically have, at least in a “narrow” sense, a pro tanto negative valence, they may nonetheless turn out to contribute to significant social and moral progress. The ethical concerns raised by SDTs require an approach that is sensitive both to the challenges inherent in the disruption and to its eventual outcome.},
keywords = {Collective action, Coping resources, Definition, Disorientation, Inequality, Social disruptive technologies, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the examples we discuss are deepfakes, cultured meat, birth control technologies). This is the applied value of the framework we offer: to offer guidance in identifying which technologies require specific scrutiny as SDT, and guidance in identifying an initial set of ethical tools to accompany such analysis. Second, we reframe the ethics of social disruption by highlighting how SDTs pose challenges to capacities for normative orientation and joint action-coordination and by foregrounding the potentially stratified availability of the resources needed to overcome or mitigate these challenges. We argue that although the burdensome disruptiveness means that SDTs characteristically have, at least in a “narrow” sense, a pro tanto negative valence, they may nonetheless turn out to contribute to significant social and moral progress. The ethical concerns raised by SDTs require an approach that is sensitive both to the challenges inherent in the disruption and to its eventual outcome.
2023
Hopster, Jeroen; Löhr, Guido
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology , vol. 36, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2023,
title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-18},
urldate = {2023-10-18},
journal = { Philosophy & Technology },
volume = {36},
abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},
keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.
Hopster, Jeroen; Maas, Matthijs
The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change
@article{nokey,
title = {The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Matthijs Maas },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-technology-triad/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00305-5 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-06-28},
urldate = {2023-06-28},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).