2026
Anderson, Joel; Hopster, Jeroen; Lundgren, Björn
Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, 2026.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Collective action, Coping resources, Definition, Disorientation, Inequality, Social disruptive technologies, Technosocial disruption
@article{nokey,
title = {Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose},
author = {Joel Anderson and Jeroen Hopster and Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Articel-JA-JH-BL.pdf},
doi = {0.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103216},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-02-05},
journal = {Technology in Society},
abstract = {Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the examples we discuss are deepfakes, cultured meat, birth control technologies). This is the applied value of the framework we offer: to offer guidance in identifying which technologies require specific scrutiny as SDT, and guidance in identifying an initial set of ethical tools to accompany such analysis. Second, we reframe the ethics of social disruption by highlighting how SDTs pose challenges to capacities for normative orientation and joint action-coordination and by foregrounding the potentially stratified availability of the resources needed to overcome or mitigate these challenges. We argue that although the burdensome disruptiveness means that SDTs characteristically have, at least in a “narrow” sense, a pro tanto negative valence, they may nonetheless turn out to contribute to significant social and moral progress. The ethical concerns raised by SDTs require an approach that is sensitive both to the challenges inherent in the disruption and to its eventual outcome.},
keywords = {Collective action, Coping resources, Definition, Disorientation, Inequality, Social disruptive technologies, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the examples we discuss are deepfakes, cultured meat, birth control technologies). This is the applied value of the framework we offer: to offer guidance in identifying which technologies require specific scrutiny as SDT, and guidance in identifying an initial set of ethical tools to accompany such analysis. Second, we reframe the ethics of social disruption by highlighting how SDTs pose challenges to capacities for normative orientation and joint action-coordination and by foregrounding the potentially stratified availability of the resources needed to overcome or mitigate these challenges. We argue that although the burdensome disruptiveness means that SDTs characteristically have, at least in a “narrow” sense, a pro tanto negative valence, they may nonetheless turn out to contribute to significant social and moral progress. The ethical concerns raised by SDTs require an approach that is sensitive both to the challenges inherent in the disruption and to its eventual outcome.
2022
Löhr, Guido
Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action? Journal Article
In: The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 72, iss. 3, pp. 754-762, 2022.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Collective action, Collective intention, Directed duties, Interpersonal obligation, Joint commitment, Shared agency
@article{nokey,
title = {Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action? },
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqab070},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-07-02},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
volume = {72},
issue = {3},
pages = {754-762},
keywords = {Collective action, Collective intention, Directed duties, Interpersonal obligation, Joint commitment, Shared agency},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}