ESDiT Publications

@article{nokey,

title = {Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice},

author = {Jeroen Hopster},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-hopster_socially-disruptve-technologies-and-epistemic-injustice-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09747-9},

issn = {1572-8439},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-02-27},

journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},

volume = {26},

issue = {1},

pages = {14},

abstract = {Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.},

keywords = {Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Balancing Caution and the Need for Change: The General Contextual Integrity Approach },

author = {Elizabeth O'Neill},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/balancing-caution-and-the-need-for-change/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00671-2},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-16},

urldate = {2023-10-16},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {4},

abstract = {In this reply to van de Poel’s (Philosophy & Technology, 35(3), 82, 2022) commentary on O’Neill (Philosophy & Technology, 35(79), 2022), I discuss two worries about the general contextual integrity approach to evaluating technological change. First, I address van de Poel’s concern that the general contextual integrity approach will not supply the right guidance in cases where morally problematic technological change poses no threat to contextual integrity. Second, I elaborate on how the approach supplies mechanisms for balancing caution with the need for change.},

keywords = {Contextual integrity, Ethics of Technology, Norm change, Socially disruptive technologies, Technological change, Value change},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-01},

urldate = {2023-08-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {74},

number = {102327},

abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},

keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-02-01},

urldate = {2023-02-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {72},

number = {102160},

abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},

keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Moral Uncertainty in Technomoral Change: Bridging the Explanatory Gap},

author = {Philip Nickel and Olya Kudina and Ibo van de Poel},

doi = {10.1162/posc_a_00414},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-04-02},

journal = {Perspectives on Science},

volume = {30},

issue = {2},

pages = {260-283},

keywords = {Moral uncertainty, Socially disruptive technologies, Techno-moral change},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Hopster2021c,

title = {Mutual Affordances. The Dynamics between Social Media and Populism},

author = {Jeroen Hopster},

doi = {10.1177/0163443720957889},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-04-01},

urldate = {2021-04-01},

journal = {Media, Culture & Society},

volume = {43},

issue = {3},

pages = {551-560},

keywords = {Affordances, Algorithms, Attention economy, Populism, Social media, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}