Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies

@article{nokey,

title = {Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent concept (Pre-Print)},

author = {Patrik Hummel},

url = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

doi = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

issn = {0003-0481},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-05-14},

urldate = {2024-05-14},

journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},

number = {1},

issue = {62},

abstract = {In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a distinctive option in argumentative space whose status and implications merit further evaluation.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {forthcoming},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {There is no "I" in Postphenomenology},

author = {Kristy Claassen},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/there-is-no-i-in-postphenomenology/},

doi = {10.1007/s10746-024-09727-4},

issn = {1572-851X},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-04-28},

journal = {Human Studies},

abstract = {Human beings are embedded in diverse social, cultural and political groups through which we make sense of our technologically mediated lived experience. This article seeks to reaffirm the postphenomenological subject as a primarily social subject. Critics maintain that the current postphenomenological framework does not adequately address the social, cultural and political context in which human-technology relations take place. In recent years, various additions to postphenomenology have been suggested in order to address this contextual deficit. In this article, I argue that a return to the phenomenological roots of postphenomenology reveals underexamined analytical tools that allow for greater socio-cultural and political sensitivity. I take Don Ihde’s supposed macroperceptual and microperceptual divide as a point of departure in claiming that postphenomenology has too hastily turned away from the subject as primarily socially situated. I draw upon the phenomenological tradition, particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, to develop a social postphenomenological approach. This approach is informed by the Schutzian notions of action, the stock of knowledge at hand and consociates. In the resulting account, the postphenomenological schema of I—Technology—World is reconstrued as We—Technology—World.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}