ESDiT Publications

@article{nokey,

title = {Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-relational-enough-towards-an-eco-relational-approach-in-robot-ethics/},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-024-00730-2},

isbn = {2210-5441},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-20},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {37},

issue = {2},

pages = {45},

keywords = {Ethical concepts, Non-human, properties, Relational ethics, Robot ethics, Social robots},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Ethics of early detection of disease risk factors: A scoping review},

author = {Sammie Jansen and Bart A. Kamphorst and Bob Mulder and Irene van Kamp and Sandra Boekhold and Peter van den hazel and Marcel Verweij},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/s12910-024-01012-4.pdf},

doi = {10.1186/s12910-024-01012-4},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-05},

urldate = {2024-03-05},

journal = {BMC Medical Ethics},

volume = {25},

abstract = {Background: Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture.

Methods: To identify key ethical considerations arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers.

Results: After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals.

Conclusions: The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies.},

keywords = {Early detection, Environmental health, Ethics, Prevention, Public health, Risk Factors, Scoping review, Screening},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice},

author = {Jeroen Hopster},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-hopster_socially-disruptve-technologies-and-epistemic-injustice-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09747-9},

issn = {1572-8439},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-02-27},

journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},

volume = {26},

issue = {1},

pages = {14},

abstract = {Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.},

keywords = {Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {E-coaching systems and social justice: ethical concerns about inequality, coercion, and stigmatization},

author = {Bart Kamphorst and Joel Anderson},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ecoaching_systems_and_social_justice_ethical_conc-wageningen_university_and_research_650099/},

doi = {10.1007/s43681-024-00424-7},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-02-19},

urldate = {2024-02-19},

journal = {AI and Ethics},

pages = {1-10},

abstract = {Poor self-regulation has been linked to various behaviors that contribute to pressing societal issues, including rising household debt, inefficient use of sustainable resources, and increasing healthcare demands. In light of this observation, the prospect of individuals receiving automated, tailored support by “e-coaching systems” to scaffold and improve their self-regulation is thought to hold promise for making society-wide progress in addressing such issues. Though there may be legitimate reasons for promoting the use of such systems, and individuals might welcome the support, our aim in the present article is to contribute to the ethics of e-coaching by showing how societal pressures towards the widespread adoption of automated e-coaching systems raise concerns in relation to three distinct aspects of social justice. We argue that societal inequalities may be introduced or exacerbated by (1) unequal access to the technologies, (2) unequally distributed restrictions to liberty and subjection to coercion, and (3) the potentially disparate impact of the use of e-coaching technologies on (self-)stigmatizing perceptions of competence. The article offers a research agenda for studying and addressing these concerns.},

keywords = {Coercion, E-coaching systems, Ethics, Inequality, social justice, Stigmatisation},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Korenhof2023,

title = {Who owns NATURE? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Alessio Gerola and Ben Hofbauer and Guido Löhr and Julia Rijssenbeek and Paulan Korenhof},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/hopster-et-al-2023-who-owns-nature-conceptual-appropriation-in-discourses-on-climate-and-biotechnologies/},

doi = {10.1177/09632719231196535},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-21},

urldate = {2023-12-21},

journal = {Environmental Values },

abstract = {Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a value-laden concept to lay a contestable claim on an underdetermined phenomenon. We illustrate the dynamics of conceptual appropriation by analyzing the concept NATURE and its uptake in three discourses of emerging technology: cellular agriculture, solar geo-engineering, and biomimicry. We argue that NATURE and its cognate NATURALNESS are strongly valanced concepts upon which different stakeholders lay a claim. In doing so, stakeholders advance distinct conceptions of nature, typically to suit their own interests. Our case-studies illustrate how in discourses on emerging technology, the application of value-concepts is entangled with ideological stakes and power dynamics.},

keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Conceptual appropriation, Emerging technologies, Naturalness, Nature, Solar climate engineering},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design},

author = {Alessio Gerola and Zoë Robaey and Vincent Blok },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s13347-023-00665-0/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00665-0},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-18},

urldate = {2023-12-18},

journal = {Philosophy and Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {81},

abstract = {This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of biomimetics philosophy and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.},

keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Nature},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Lenzi2023,

title = {Justice in benefitting from carbon removal},

author = {Dominic Lenzi and Hanna Schübel and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/justice-in-benefitting-from-carbon-removal/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2023.22},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-12},

urldate = {2023-12-12},

journal = {Global Sustainability },

volume = {6},

pages = {1-8},

abstract = {Non-Technical Summary

Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities.



Technical Summary

Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent could remove as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favourable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible.},

keywords = {adaptation and mitigation, policies, politics and governance},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Puzio2023,

title = {Robot, let us pray! Can and should robots have religious functions? An ethical exploration of religious robots},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/robot-let-us-pray/},

doi = {10.1007/s00146-023-01812-z},

isbn = {1435-5655},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-11},

urldate = {2023-12-11},

journal = {AI & Society},

abstract = {Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research.},

keywords = {Ethics, Existential, Relegious robots, Religion, Social robots, Spirituality},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology},

author = {Tom Hannes and Gunter Bombaerts},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/what-does-it-mean-that-all-is-aflame/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/205301962311539},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-01},

urldate = {2023-12-01},

journal = {The Anthropocene Review},

volume = {10},

issue = {3},

pages = {771-786},

abstract = {Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.},

keywords = {Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?},

author = {Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/can-the-normic-de-minimis-eut-save-the-minimis-principles/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-28},

urldate = {2023-11-28},

journal = {Erkenntnis},

abstract = {Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.},

keywords = {minimis Expected Utility Theory},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability },

author = {Bart A. Kamphorst and Adam Henschke},

doi = {10.1007/s10676-023-09732-8},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-16},

urldate = {2023-11-16},

journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},

volume = {25},

issue = {4},

abstract = {The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.},

keywords = {Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research},

author = {Caroline Bollen},

doi = {10.1016/j.metip.2022.100109},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-15},

urldate = {2023-11-15},

journal = {Methods in Psychology},

volume = {8},

number = {100109},

keywords = {Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation},

author = {Evgeni Aizenberg and Matthew Dennis and Jeroen van den Hoven},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/examining-the-assumptions-of-ai/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01783-1},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-21},

urldate = {2023-10-21},

journal = {AI & Society},

abstract = {In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.},

keywords = {AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets?},

author = {Emily Sullivan},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/do-machine-learning-models-represent-their-targets/},

doi = {0.1017/psa.2023.151},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-20},

urldate = {2023-10-20},

journal = {Philosophy of Sciences},

pages = {1-11},

abstract = {I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.},

keywords = {Epistemology, Machine learning},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-18},

urldate = {2023-10-18},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology },

volume = {36},

abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},

keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Balancing Caution and the Need for Change: The General Contextual Integrity Approach },

author = {Elizabeth O'Neill},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/balancing-caution-and-the-need-for-change/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00671-2},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-16},

urldate = {2023-10-16},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {4},

abstract = {In this reply to van de Poel’s (Philosophy & Technology, 35(3), 82, 2022) commentary on O’Neill (Philosophy & Technology, 35(79), 2022), I discuss two worries about the general contextual integrity approach to evaluating technological change. First, I address van de Poel’s concern that the general contextual integrity approach will not supply the right guidance in cases where morally problematic technological change poses no threat to contextual integrity. Second, I elaborate on how the approach supplies mechanisms for balancing caution with the need for change.},

keywords = {Contextual integrity, Ethics of Technology, Norm change, Socially disruptive technologies, Technological change, Value change},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement},

author = {Michael Klenk and Ibo van de Poel},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-a-good-fix/},

doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-13},

urldate = {2023-10-13},

journal = {Erkenntnis},

abstract = {We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.},

keywords = {Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy?},

author = {Björn Lundgren},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-lack-of-literature-engagement-a-reason-for-rejecting-a-paper-in-philosophy/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-10},

urldate = {2023-10-10},

journal = {Res Publica},

abstract = {Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.},

keywords = {Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities},

author = {Philip Nickel and Iris Loosman and Lily Frank and Anna Vinnikova },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s44206-023-00075-x/},

doi = {10.1007/s44206-023-00075-x },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-10},

urldate = {2023-10-10},

journal = {Digital Society},

volume = {2},

abstract = {The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.},

keywords = {Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health  literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Value Change and Technological Design},

author = {Freek van der Weij and Steffen Steinert and Ibo van Poel and Joost Alleblas and Anna Melnyk and Tristan de Wildt and David Abbink and Denise Almeida},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/value_change_and_technological_design/},

doi = {10.1109/MTS.2023.3302406},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-22},

urldate = {2023-09-22},

journal = {IEEE Technology and Society Magazine},

volume = {42},

number = {3},

pages = {25-32},

abstract = {Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).},

keywords = {Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A historical perspective of biomedical explainable AI research},

author = {Luca Malinverno and Vesna Barros and Francesco Ghisoni and Giovanni Visonà and Roman Kern and Philip Nickel and Barbara Ventura and Ilija Šimić and Sarah Stryeck and Francesca Manni and Cesar Ferri and Claire Jean-Quartier and Laura Genga and Gabriele Schweikert and Mario Lovrić and Michal Rosen-Zvi},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/1-s2-0-s266638992300199x-main/},

doi = {10.1016/j.patter.2023.100830 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-08},

urldate = {2023-09-08},

journal = {Patterns},

volume = {4},

issue = {9},

pages = {9},

abstract = {The black-box nature of most artificial intelligence (AI) models encourages the development of explainability methods to engender trust into the AI decision-making process. Such methods can be broadly categorized into two main types: post hoc explanations and inherently interpretable algorithms. We aimed at analyzing the possible associations between COVID-19 and the push of explainable AI (XAI) to the forefront of biomedical research. We automatically extracted from the PubMed database biomedical XAI studies related to concepts of causality or explainability and manually labeled 1,603 papers with respect to XAI categories. To compare the trends pre- and post-COVID-19, we fit a change point detection model and evaluated significant changes in publication rates. We show that the advent of COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020 could be the driving factor behind an increased focus concerning XAI, playing a crucial role in accelerating an already evolving trend. Finally, we present a discussion with future societal use and impact of XAI technologies and potential future directions for those who pursue fostering clinical trust with interpretable machine learning models.},

keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Corona virus, COVID-19, Decision-making, Explainability, Foundation models, Machine learning, Meta-review, PRISMA, Trustworthiness},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs},

author = {Bernice Bovenkerk and Keje Boersma},

doi = {10.5840/enviroethics202382964},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-05},

urldate = {2023-09-05},

journal = {Environmental Ethics},

volume = {45},

number = {4},

pages = {381-402},

abstract = {In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and

gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular

technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is

exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.

The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is

how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption

of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential

implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.

Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it

is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the

development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of

these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.

It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need

to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.},

keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Sustainability as an Intrinsic Moral Concern for Solidaristic Health Care},

author = {Marcel Verweij and Hans Ossebaard },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s10728-023-00469-5/},

doi = {10.1007/s10728-023-00469-5},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-04},

urldate = {2023-09-04},

journal = {Health Care Analysis},

abstract = {Environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change have adverse impacts on global health. Somewhat paradoxically, health care systems that aim to prevent and cure disease are themselves major emitters and polluters. In this paper we develop a justification for the claim that solidaristic health care systems should include sustainability as one of the criteria for determining which health interventions are made available or reimbursed – and which not. There is however a complication: most adverse health effects due to climate change do occur elsewhere in the world. If solidarity would commit us to take care of everyone’s health, worldwide, it might imply that solidaristic health system cannot justifiably restrict universal access to their own national populations. In response we explain health solidarity is to be considered as a moral ideal. Such an ideal does not specify what societies owe to whom, but it does have moral implications. We argue that ignoring sustainability in political decision making about what health care is to be offered, would amount to betrayal of the ideal of solidarity.},

keywords = {Climate change, Environmental pollution, Environmental sustainability},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A fairway to fairness: Toward a richer conceptualization of fairness perceptions for just energy transitions},

author = {Michèlle Bal and Marijn Stok and Gunter Bombaerts and Nicole Huijts and Philipp Schneider and Andreas Spahn and Vincent Buskens

},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/a-fairway-to-fairness-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103213},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-01},

urldate = {2023-09-01},

journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},

volume = {103},

abstract = {Current energy justice literature has developed a strong empirical approach to describe how justice plays a role in energy transitions. We argue that the individual-level perception measures are insufficiently developed within this field, while they are vital for a successful just energy transition. Reviewing studies on how people (citizens, users or consumers) perceive fairness in the context of the energy transition, we first investigate how fairness perceptions are currently studied within energy social science. Subsequently, we look into social and environmental justice research and interdependent decision-experiments, to map potential extensions of fairness conceptualizations and measures. Following the triumvirate model of energy justice – distinguishing distributive, procedural, and recognitive justice – we found that only recently studies also contained recognition justice aspects, while the majority of energy social science studies focuses on either distributive or procedural aspects. Extending these insights, we argue that environmental justice research provides a potential way of specifying groups to be recognized in the energy transition (i.e., future generations, non-human species, humans worldwide). Moreover, we propose that interactional justice could be an additional tenet of citizen's fairness perceptions to consider. Importantly, for a successful global energy transition, in-depth insight into the principles underlying people's justice judgments is necessary. Social justice theorizing and interdependent decision-experiments offer concrete ways of tapping into these principles. Interdependent decision-experiments in particular pose a way of measuring fairness tendencies that could be applied to the specific context of the energy transition and be expanded beyond the current research focus measuring distributive justice perceptions.},

keywords = {Behavioral game theory, Distributive fairness, Environmental justice, Fairness perceptions, Procedural fairness, Recognitive fairness},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Meaningful Human Control over AI for Health? A Review},

author = {Eva Maria Hille and Patrik Hummel and Matthias Braun},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/meaningful-human-control-over-ai-for-health/},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-27},

urldate = {2022-08-27},

journal = {BMJ Journals},

abstract = {Artificial intelligence is currently changing many areas of society. Especially in health, where critical decisions are made, questions of control must be renegotiated: who is in control when an automated system makes clinically relevant decisions? Increasingly, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) is being invoked for this purpose. However, it is unclear exactly how this concept is to be understood in health. Through a systematic review, we present the current state of the concept of MHC in health. The results show that there is not yet a robust MHC concept for health. We propose a broader understanding of MHC along three strands of action: enabling, exercising and evaluating control. Taking into account these strands of action and the established rules and processes in the different health sectors, the MHC concept needs to be further developed to avoid falling into two gaps, which we have described as theoretical and labelling gaps.},

keywords = {Meaningful human control, Self-determination},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Structuring values and normative frameworks using Schwartz's value theory to map the three tenets of energy justice},

author = {Gunter Bombaerts and Andreas Spahn and Erik Laes },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/structuring-values-and-normative-framworks-using-schwartz-vaule-theory/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103244},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-10},

urldate = {2023-08-10},

journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},

volume = {104},

abstract = {Recent energy justice studies have explicitly introduced different normative frameworks. However, an elaboration of how these newly introduced normative frameworks relate to each other is missing in the energy justice literature. This could lead to false expectations that a specific normative framework could solve the normative challenges of energy justice. We indicate that normative frameworks embrace specific values and priority rules, but still lack an attempt to map out a general overall value structure of human and societal values in general. We introduce Shalom Schwartz's core value theory to propose a structure that allows us to map key values and their relation to energy justice. We illustrate that the three-tenets framework as such lacks normative guidance and show how Schwartz theory can be used to scaffold the three-tenets framework in dealing with underlying value disputes. The study concludes that Schwartz's theory proves useful in addressing the lack of a normative framework structure. The study indicates the individual approach as a key limitation and proposes further analyses towards a more collective approach.},

keywords = {Energy justice, Justification, Normative framework, Shalom Schwartz, Three-tenets framework, Value structure},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-01},

urldate = {2023-08-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {74},

number = {102327},

abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},

keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Towards a Pragmatic and Pluralist Framework for Energy Justice},

author = {Erik Laes and Gunter Bombaerts and Andreas Spahn },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/towards-a-pragmatic-and-pluralist-framework-for-energy-justice/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00654-3},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-31},

urldate = {2023-07-31},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {53},

abstract = {The three-tenet model, which focuses on ‘distributional justice’, ‘procedural justice’, and ‘justice as recognition’, has emerged as the most influential framework in the field of energy justice. Based on critical reviews of the three-tenet model, we identify three challenges that the model currently still faces: (i) a normative challenge on the grounding of the three-tenet model in philosophical theories; (ii) an ‘elite’ challenge on the justification of the use of power in energy-related decision; and (iii) a practical challenge on the application of the three tenets in situations of conflicting justice demands. In this article, we provide the basic contours of a three-step pluralist and pragmatic dialogue model for questions of energy justice that addresses the three challenges, based on the ‘commonwealth model’ of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. The model proposes to create moral legitimacy in the face of plural demands for energy justice by engaging actors in an inclusive dialogue based on an explicit recognition of Boltanski and Thévenot’s commonwealth model. We thereby make three contributions to the existing literature on energy justice. First, the commonwealth model’s rootedness in normative political theory provides a stronger philosophical underpinning than was available up till now in the literature (challenge 1). Second, it allows one to go beyond the (almost exclusive) focus on injustices perpetrated on disempowered or marginalised groups, to include questions on the justified exercise of power (challenge 2). Third, the commonwealth model shows us practical ways out of situations where conflicting demands for justice are being made (challenge 3).},

keywords = {Boltanski and Thévenot, Energy justice, Justification, Orders of worth, Three tenets},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Towards a Clear and Fair Conceptualization of Empathy},

author = {Caroline Bollen},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/towards-a-clear-and-fair-conceptualization-of-empathy/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2227963},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-26},

journal = {Social Epistemology},

volume = {37},

number = {5},

pages = {637-655},

abstract = {Empathy is operationalised and measured in various different ways in research. I have identified several trends in empathy research that have resulted in what I refer to as neurotypical gatekeeping of the concept of empathy. Narrow assumptions on the relationship between experiences and expressions have made the concept exclusive to those who are perceived as neurotypical. In several ways, this has biased our knowledge of empathy, especially regarding autism. This does not only invalidate autistic empathy, but also sustains a harmful and stigmatizing narrative of autism. In this paper, I expand on the neurotypical gatekeeping of empathy as a matter of epistemic injustice and argue why and how neurodiversity calls for a reconceptualization of empathy. I continue by building a proposal for a clear and fair notion of empathy. I argue that we need to settle the dispute on empathy and morality by accepting the value associated with empathy in society, and use an anti-discriminatory normative conceptualization accordingly. I propose to understand empathy as appropriately attending to experiential differences and similarities, balancing between – what I introduce as - distantism and proximism. I discuss conceptual and methodological implications of this approach to empathy, as well as its application to neurodiversity.},

keywords = {Autism, Empathy, Epistemic injustice, Neurodiversity},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1111/mila.12473},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-20},

urldate = {2023-07-20},

journal = {Mind and Language},

abstract = {Many psychologists currently assume that there is a psychologically real distinction to be made between concepts that are abstract and concepts that are concrete. It is for example largely agreed that concepts and words are more easily processed if they are concrete. Moreover, it is assumed that this is because these words and concepts are concrete. It is thought that interesting generalizations can be made about certain concepts because they are concrete. I argue that we have surprisingly little reason to believe that the abstract-concrete distinction is psychologically real.},

keywords = {Abstract concepts, Psychology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.33735/phimisci.2023.9632},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-19},

urldate = {2023-07-19},

journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},

volume = {4},

abstract = {Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.},

keywords = {Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem},

author = {Guido Löhr and Christian Michel},

doi = {10.1111/mila.12471},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-18},

urldate = {2023-07-18},

journal = {Mind and Language},

abstract = {According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.},

keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Matthijs Maas },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-technology-triad/},

doi = {doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00305-5 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-06-28},

urldate = {2023-06-28},

journal = {AI and Ethics},

abstract = {Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).},

keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Fraaije2023,

title = {Creating room for citizen perspectives in ‘smart city’ Amsterdam through interactive theatre},

author = {Aafke Fraaije and Marjoleine van der Meij and Arnold Vermeeren and Frank Kupper and Jacqueline Broerse},

doi = {10.14324/rfa.07.1.05},

issn = {2399-8121},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-05-23},

urldate = {2023-05-23},

volume = {7},

number = {1},

publisher = {UCL Press},

abstract = {The ‘smart city’ vision is popular, but it lacks citizen perspectives. The aim of this study was to gain insight into whether and how art-based citizen engagement can create more room for citizen perspectives in smart cities by developing and testing an art-based citizen engagement project in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. To that end, a combination of interactive theatre, interaction design and social research methods was used to bring together diverse publics and innovation professionals for joint exploration of increased dataveillance in cities. The events were studied through observations, and through interviews with participants and organisers. Data analysis was guided by the outcomes, processes and challenges of the responsible innovation dimensions: inclusion, reflexivity, anticipation and responsiveness (Stilgoe et al., 2013). The most important achievements of art-based citizen engagement were: engaging people who would not have engaged with the topic otherwise, encouraging participants to question common phrases and assumptions, exploring future social implications of technologies, and staging meaningful interactions between citizens and professionals. The most significant challenge was to involve citizens in a way that could influence innovation trajectories.},

keywords = {General Medicine},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly?},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s43681-023-00295-4},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-05-16},

urldate = {2023-05-16},

journal = {AI and Ethics},

abstract = {Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.},

keywords = {AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Techno-fixing non-compliance - Geoengineering, ideal theory and residual responsibility},

author = {Martin Sand and Benjamin Hofbauer and Joost Alleblas},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/techno-fixing-non-compliance-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102236},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-05-01},

urldate = {2023-05-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {73},

abstract = {After years of missing the agreed upon goals for carbon reduction, we might conclude that global climate policies set infeasible standards to halt climate change. The widespread non-compliance of many signees with frameworks such as the Paris Agreement indicates that these frameworks were too optimistic regarding the signees’ motivation to act. One of the suggested ways out of this impasse, is geoengineering, which is seen as a “techno-fix” of the non-compliance problem, relieving signees and other actors of some, or most, of their mitigation duties. This paper scrutinizes different approaches towards climate mitigation that focus on behavioral change or on technological solutions. We argue that these different approaches do not originate from categorically different theories of climate justice. Indeed, seemingly realistic and seemingly idealistic proposals do not disagree on the substance of climate justice, but about what is to be considered feasible. Furthermore, by applying this dialectic lens on ideal vs. non-ideal theorizing in the context of climate justice, we show that (backward-looking) residual responsibility is an overlooked aspect of geoengineering as a (forward-looking) non-ideal approach to achieve climate justice. We will outline three possible consequences of this moral residue: 1) Residual responsibility can provide grounds to demand compensation, 2) it can constitute other forward-looking responsibilities (e.g., the maintenance of geoengineering technologies) and 3) it provides a reason to employ other techno-fixes equal in effectiveness and risks that do not sidestep the problem of non-compliance.},

keywords = {Climate change, Geoengineering, Ideal Theory, Non-compliance, Responsibility, Tecno-fix},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Living Well Together Online: Digital Wellbeing from a Confucian Perspective},

author = {Matthew Dennis and Elena Ziliotti},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-applied-philosophy-2022-dennis-living-well-together-online-digital-wellbeing-from-a-confucian-perspective/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12627},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-05-01},

urldate = {2023-05-01},

journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},

volume = {40},

number = {2},

abstract = {The impact of social media technologies (SMTs) on digital wellbeing has become an increasingly important puzzle for ethicists of technology. In this article, we explain why individualised theories of digital wellbeing (DWB) can only solve part of this puzzle. While an individualised conception of DWB is useful for understanding online self-regulation, we contend that we must seek greater understanding of how SMTs connect us. To build an account of this, we locate the conceptual resources for our account in Confucian ethics. In contrast to individualised conceptions of human flourishing that are found in the Western tradition, Confucian thinkers strongly emphasise that individuals cannot flourish alone, but need wider social structures (partner, family, society, nation). Not only do strands of Confucian ethics explain how individuals are defined by the roles they take up in relationships, but this perspective also makes practical suggestions for how these roles can be cultivated. We conclude our article by identifying the Confucian notions that seem to have most promise for the future design of SMTs.},

keywords = {Confucian perspective, Digital well-being},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Exemplars and expertise: what we cannot learn from saints and heroes},

author = {Alfred Archer and Matthew Dennis},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/exemplars-and-expertise-what-we-cannot-learn-from-saints-and-heroes/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2196681},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-04-08},

journal = { Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy},

abstract = {According to a popular line of thought, moral exemplars have a key role to play in moral development and moral education and by paying attention to moral exemplars we can learn about what morality requires of us. However, when we pay attention to what many moral exemplars say about their actions, it seems that our moral obligations are much more demanding than we typically think they are. Some philosophers have argued that this exemplar testimony gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality. We argue against this view by appealing to similar testimony from aesthetic exemplars. If we accept that the testimony of moral exemplars gives us reason to accept a radically demanding view of morality, then we should accept that the testimony of aesthetic exemplars supports a radically demanding view of aesthetic normativity. We argue that we should reject both arguments for radically demanding views, and instead see the testimony of exemplars as having something important to tell us about the nature of ideals. What we learn about morality and aesthetics from attending to the lives of moral exemplars is that those who embody an ideal are subject to obligations that others are not.},

keywords = {Aesthetic normativity, Moral demandingness, Moral exemplars, Obligation, Supererogation},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Disruptieve technologie},

author = {Jeroen Hopster},

url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.001.HOPS},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-04-01},

urldate = {2023-04-01},

journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},

volume = {63},

issue = {1},

pages = {4-5},

keywords = {Disruptive technology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Brain Computer Interfaces},

author = {Bouke van Balen and Janna van Grunsven and Mariska Vansteensel and Wijnand IJsselsteijn},

url = {https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.5117/WP2023.1.003.BALE},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-04-01},

journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief},

volume = {63},

issue = {1},

pages = {16-23},

keywords = {Brain computer interfaces},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}